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Toward a Situational Model for
Regulating International Crimes
Andrew K. Woods*
Abstract
The international criminal regime, as currently conceived, relies almost exclusively on the
power of backward-looking criminal sanctions to deter future international crimes. This model
reflects the dominant mid-century approach to crime control, which was essentialy reactive.
Since then, domestic criminal scholars and practitioners have developed and implemented new
theories of crime control-theories notable for their promise of crime prevention through ex ante
attention to communiy and environmental factors. Community policing crime prevention
through environmental design, and related "situational" approaches to crime control have had a
signficant impact on the administration of domestic criminal law.
This Article evaluates the implications of these approaches for the international criminal
regime. Despite the significant distinctions between international and domestic crimes, there are
important similarities-most notably, the finding that environmental factors play a key role in
the commission of both sorts of crimes. This finding creates space for the situational turn at the
international level. Applying this model to the international regime has implications for how we
understand and design tactics aimed at preventing international crimes ex ante. It also has real
and theoretical implications for expostjusice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the central goals of the international criminal regime is the
prevention of international crimes: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.' To date, practitioners and scholars of international criminal law
concerned with this goal have largely focused on the preventive capacity of
international criminal tribunals where the worst actors are accused of the gravest
crimes.' They have paid comparatively little attention to other institutions or
other mechanisms for preventing international crimes.
I See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 5 (1998), 2187 UN Treaty Ser No 90
(2002) (Rome Statute). I do not discuss here the crime of aggression, which is not yet an
actionable offense in the International Criminal Court (ICC).
2 See, fot example, id at Preamble (stating that the parties to the statute are "[djetermined to put an
end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of
such crimes"). See also 22 TDial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Miitar Tribunal:
Alurembrg 14 lNovember 1945-1 October 1946 466 (Nuremberg 1948) ("Crimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only iy punishing inairidualr who commit rueb
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This omission is striking on its own. Scholars have long bemoaned the
difficulty of achieving the many goals of international criminal law with the
single, relatively blunt instrument of the individual criminal trial.3 But this
omission is especially striking today given the significant changes seen in the last
forty years to both the theory and practice of domestic crime control.
In that time, criminal law scholars have developed a number of theories to
understand how social and environmental factors contribute to the likelihood of
crime," and domestic criminal regimes around the world now explicitly seek to
influence these factors.' Perhaps best known among these is the "broken
windows" theory that crime is connected to the perceived disorderliness of a
particular environment.' The broken windows theory is the most controversial
of the many "situational" models of crime and crime control; related theories
include community-oriented policing,' crime prevention through environmental
design,' situational crime prevention,9 and problem-oriented policing,"o inter alia.
While the efficacy of the various situational crime control policies is the subject
cimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.") (emphasis added). See generally Mirjan R.
Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 Chi Kent L Rev 329 (2008) (noting
the many often-competing goals of the international criminal regime-including retribution,
deterrence, and conflict resolution-and arguing that trials are unlikely to achieve all aims); Mark
A. Drumbl, Atmdlty, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge 2007) (noting the limits of the
domestic criminal model to address the exceptional nature of mass atrocity).
3 See, for example, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Princile and Pragmatism in
Strategies ofInternationalJustice, 28 Ind Security 5, 5 (Winter 2003-04) (arguing that the prosecution
of individual perpetrators "risks causing more atrocities than it would prevent").
4 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va L Rev 349 (1997)
(applying social norms research to criminal law). See also George L. Kelling and Catherine M.
Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in our Communiies 158 (Touchstone
1998) (describing the shift toward community-oriented crime prevention and the importance of
prevention rather than reaction).
5 See generally Dieter Dolling and Thomas Feltes, eds, Community Policing: Comparative Aspects of
Community Onented Police Work (Felix-Verlag 1993) (surveying community policing practices in
Germany, Ireland, Belgium, and Hungary, inter alia). I will focus the bulk of my inquiry on crime
control theories, but this will necessitate occasionally discussing theories of criminogenesis.
6 See generally James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, 249 Atlantic Mag 29 (1982) (introducing the broken windows theory).
I See, for example, Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Cime and the Spiral of Decay in American
Neighborhoods 159-86 (Free Press 1990) (analyzing community policing as a solution to the
relationship between disorder and neighborhood decline).
8 See generally, for example, C. Ray Jeffery, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (Sage 1971);
Carri Casteel and Corinne Peek-Asa, Efectiveness of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(CPTED) in Reducing Robbeies, 18 Am J Prey Med 99 (2000).
9 See generally Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, 19 Crime & Just 91 (1995).
1o See generally, for example, Anthony A. Braga, et al, Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth
Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire, 38 J Rsrch Crime & Delinq 195 (2001);
Herman Goldstein, Improving Poliing: A Problem-OrientedApproach, 25 Crime & Delinq 236 (1979).
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of ongoing empirical debate, even the most strident critics welcome the general
turn of attention toward social and environmental phenomena ex ante." Yet
insights from this new approach-insights about both the successes and pitfalls
of various situational strategies, as well as more theoretical gains-have not been
applied to the international criminal regime.
This Article seeks to fill this gap by showing how and why the situational
approach is relevant to international criminal law, by outlining the conceptual
and practical reforms implicated by this approach, and by sketching some of the
larger implications of incorporating situational models into international criminal
law. The effort proceeds in four sections.
Section II outlines the situational approach to crime control and identifies
four key features of that approach. The Section then addresses the growing
empirical literature evaluating the efficacy of police tactics common to the
situational approach.
Section III seeks to explain why situational approaches are relevant to
international criminal law. It compares international and domestic regimes,
focusing in particular on the similarities and differences in the crimes, the
criminals, the politics, and the environments. Recent studies have found that
local environments matter to the commission of international crimes.12 Studies
have also shown international environmental effects: a major predictor of a
failed state's risk of mass atrocity is the extent to which that state is embedded in
" See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Polidng 21
(Harvard 2001) (offering a critique of broken windows policing, but noting that "the turn to
norm-driven hypotheses and social meaning is a positive development for criminal justice")
(emphasis omitted). I discuss the empirical data behind these claims, and their critiques, in Section
II.B. Harcourt provides the most thoughtful critique of order maintenance policing as
implemented in American cities. There is a substantial debate about "zero tolerance" policies in
particular, and broken windows policing in general, though most of this work is not generalizable
to other situational reforms such as community partnerships or to environmental reforms such as
target hardening. A recent study-one of the only randomized controlled trials-showed that
situational police tactics generally had a significant impact on crime, but the study found that the
effect could be attributed more to environmental changes such as cleaning up abandoned
warehouses than to misdemeanor arrests. See Anthony A. Braga and Brenda J. Bond, Policing
Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 Criminol 577, 599 (2008). This
suggests that situational crime prevention is more effective than order maintenance tactics, and it
is consistent with Harcourt's work. See Harcourt, The Illusion of Order at 221 ("Instead of arresting
turnstile jumpers, for instance, we can-and New York City has begun to-install turnstiles that
cannot be jumped.").
12 See Daniel Muitoz-Rojas and Jean-Jacques Fresard, The Roots of Behaviour in far Understanding and
Preventing IHL Violations, 86 Intl Rev Red Cross 189, 203-04 (2004) (observing that the lack of
order and discipline in a particular situation contributes to war crimes). Local environmental
effects have also been shown relevant to mass atrocity. See Barbara Harff, No Lessons Learned from
the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Polical Mass Murder Since 1955, 97 Am Pol Sci Rev 57,
61 (2003).
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and interconnected with the international community of states. 3 Section III
argues that the presence of environmental influences on crime in the
international realm invites the application of the situational approach.
Section IV details some of the practical and theoretical implications of that
move. Many of the specific policies called for by this approach already exist in
the international realm, but they are under-theorized as aspects of the
international criminal regime, and therefore under-developed as tools for
regulating crime.14 Much like signs that warn "this area is under surveillance," the
situational approach would call for warnings issued, for example, to rebel groups
poised to commit international crimes. Section IV explores these and other
reforms for crime prevention above and beyond the deterrent effect of
retributive international criminal trials.
Section V examines how these situational prevention strategies interact
with-and potentially interfere with-existing ex post mechanisms of
international justice such as international criminal trials. One lesson of the
situational trend in the domestic realm is that such reforms are not mere
supplements to existing laws and policies. The rise of "community justice" can
be seen as an acknowledgment that situational approaches to crime control call
for significant reforms by courts and prosecutors.'" Applying the situational
approach to the international criminal regime may similarly prompt a
13 See Harff, 97 Am Pol Sci Rev at 61-62 (noting that 36 of the 37 genocides between 1955 and
1997 occurred in failed states, when there were 126 such failed states; asking "why some such
conflicts lead to episodes of mass murder, whereas most do not"; and suggesting that the
"international environment is a major source of both incentives for and constraints on elite's use
of repression [during such conflicts]").
14 For example, monitoring for international crimes is a crucial component of the international
regime, but available monitoring tools, from satellites to watchdog groups, are largely used to
document crimes and prosecute criminals; existing approaches under-appreciate how the same
monitoring tools can be deployed to prevent crime ex ante. See Phoebe Wynn-Pope and Steph
Cousins, Early Warning for Protection: Technologies and Practice for the Prevention ofMassAtrody Crimes 17
(Oxfam Austl 2011) ("New technology-based approaches in their current forms are generally not
focused on predicting crises and tracking long-term trends or patterns."). This bias toward ex post
mechanisms is true for how the international criminal regime is taught as well. One who takes a
class on international criminal law will find procedural details about international criminal
tribunals, the aims of their sentencing schemes, and the like, but next to nothing on prevention of
crime through means other than sentencing. See generally, for example, Antonio Cassese, The
Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International law, 4J Ind Crim Just 933 (2006). Domestic
criminal law is similarly focused on the traditional institutions of criminal justice, but there is a
considerable and influential effort to reform legal education to include a greater emphasis on
social and environmental contributors to crime as well as the institutions involved in their
regulation. See generally Tracey L. Meares, Dan M. Kahan, and Neal Katyal, Updating the Study of
Punishment, 56 Stan L Rev 1171 (2004) (calling for reform of basic introductory criminal law
courses and casebooks to reflect situational insights).
Is See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 321, 322-23
(2002).
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reevaluation and reform of the roles of international courts and prosecutors.
Insofar as the situational approach better accounts for and/or enhances the
regime's ability to prevent international crimes, it may fruitfully inform the
contemporary debate about sentencing in international criminal law.' 6 If crime
prevention is thought to occur outside of or in addition to what is achieved
through individual criminal trials, it may lift some of the heavy burden on trials
to achieve total deterrence, and in so doing, it may free them to pursue other
regime goals: retribution, reconciliation, or truth-telling, inter alia. Furthermore,
by treating punishment and prevention as distinct yet interrelated aspects of the
regime, this approach may offer insight into the dynamic relationship between
the two.
II. THE SITUATIONAL MODEL OF CRIME CONTROL
Approximately forty years ago-beginning in the US and UK and then
spreading to mainland Europe and beyond-criminologists disenchanted with
ex post mechanisms for controlling crime began to theorize and implement new,
community-oriented police strategies that were concerned with anticipating and
directly acting on the social and environmental correlates of crime." This shift
has been well documented as a significant change in both the focus of
scholarship and the regulation of crime." Consider a typical assessment from
criminologist Wesley Skogan:
Community policing is the most important development in policing in the
past quarter century. Across the country, police chiefs report that they are
moving towards this new model of policing, which supplements traditional
crime fighting with a problem-solving and prevention-oriented approach
that emphasizes the role of the public in helping set police priorities. 9
The shift in police priorities was seen worldwide. Evidence from comparative
studies suggests that police forces across the world have adopted many aspects
of situational policing, and international observers continue to advocate further
situational reforms in the police forces of developing countries.20
16 As Mark Drumbl notes, international criminal law is still on a "[q]uest for [p]urpose." Atroity at
149 (cited in note 2).
'7 See George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, From Podlical to Reform to Community: The Evolving
Strategy of Police, in Jack R. Greene and Stephen D. Mastrofski, eds, Communiy Poheing: Rhetoric or
Reality 3, 9-17 (Praeger 1988).
8 For a description of the shift, see id.
19 Wesley G. Skogan and Jeffrey A. Roth, Introduction, in Wesley G. Skogan, ed, Community Poliang:
Can it Work? xvii, xvii (Wadsworth 2003).
20 For evidence of the change, see Jeffrey A. Roth, Jan Roehl, and Calvin Johnson, Trends in
Community Pohiing, in Skogan, ed, Community Pohing 3, 5 (cited in note 19) (reporting the results of
a nationwide telephone survey finding significant increases from pre-1995 levels to 1998 and 2000
levels of four specific community-oriented police tactics). For an account of the practice not
matching the rhetoric, see Dominique Wisler and Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe, eds, Community
Vol. 13 No. 1184
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This policing strategy arose as an alternative to the predominant mid-
century approach known as the "professional" or managerial model of policing.
That model was characterized by the ideal of rapid response to individual reports
of crime followed by a host of ex post mechanisms, including investigations by
detectives intent on identifying who committed the crime and following up with
witnesses and victims in a large post-crime production. Nearly the entire
machinery of criminal law enforcement was backwards facing. The scholarship
that marks this period focused on sentencing policy and specific deterrence:
setting sentences at a level such that a rational actor would find the costs of
crime too high despite the expected gains, while taking into account the ex post
enforcement machinery and a rapid response police team." These sentences
were imagined to operate as a disincentive, in that a potential criminal, just
before stealing an automobile, would imagine the harsh sentence he would
receive and would be deterred from committing the crime unless he thought the
gains from the theft were worth the risk of sanction. Under this model, the
strength of the disincentive depends upon the likelihood of detection and
enforcement-a criminal would steal the car no matter the harsh sentence if
there were no chance of being caught-and so it calls for a focus on swift and
sure police response to crime. This model, despite its successes, was criticized in
significant part for ignoring social and environmental contributors to crime and
for ignoring communities in high crime areas-those well positioned to identify,
and in some cases to address, these situational influences.22
Situational policing, in contrast, is centrally concerned with police-
community dynamics and the environmental correlates of crime.23 The related
scholarship focuses on situational crime regulation as much or more than ex
post sanctions, and it is accordingly more broadly focused on criminal trends
and their causes rather than on the occurrence of a single criminal act. There are
different situational theories implemented by different scholars and policy-
makers, but I group them and identify their shared features.
A. Design Elements
The situational approach to crime control is marked by four key features:
environmental design; a "problem-oriented" method that encourages expanding
Policing: Intemational Pattens and Comparative Perspectives vii-ix (CRC 2009) (noting that the language
of community-oriented policing has been adopted worldwide but implemented in different ways
and with varying degrees of fidelity to the core community policing principles). For an example of
a prominent human rights advocate and academic encouraging further police reform along these
lines, see Mission to Nigeria, Report of the Special Rcpporteur on Civil and Political Rights, UN Comm HR,
62d Sess, Agenda item 11(b), UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.4 (2006).
21 For a thorough overview of this period, see Larry Siegel, Criminology 526-28 (West 4th ed 1992).
22 See Kelling and Moore, From Political to Reform to Community at 9 (cited in note 17).
23 1 say "correlates" because it is not clear whether in each case these environmental factors were
mere byproducts or were in fact contributors to crime.
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the scope of regulatory inquiry to include social and environmental phenomena
and not simply criminal acts; an expanded conception of police, emphasizing
strategic partnerships with public agencies outside of the criminal justice system
and partnerships with community members; and finally, an emphasis on
proactive laws and policies where older approaches emphasized reaction to
-24cnmes.
1. Environmental design.
The situational approach to crime regulation explicitly focuses on the
relationship between crime and the immediate social and physical
environments. 25 As criminologist Ronald Clarke notes, the new policing is
marked by "the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate
environment in as systematic and permanent a way as possible so as to reduce
the opportunities for crime and increase its risks as perceived by a wide range of
offenders."2 6 The turn to environmental design comes out of an earlier literature
about situational factors-social and physical-that affect misbehavior and that
could theoretically be "designed out."27 This turn toward environmental factors
can be seen as part of a much broader situational trend in legal scholarship. 28
24 I have drawn these from several sources. Roth, Rochl, and Johnson give a summary of the
community policing movement (one of several situational criminology movements), outlining
four key metrics for evaluating the implementation a situational approach to criminal justice:
partnership building, problem solving, prevention, and supportive organizational changes. Trends
in Community Policing at 5 (cited in note 20). Kelling, meanwhile, notes that the new policing trend
is marked by five things: "problem solving, community policing, consultation, partnership,
accountability." George L. Kelling, Police and Communiies: The Quiet Revolution, Perspectives on
Policing 2 (US Dept of Justice June 1988). Different authors focus on other features of the
community policing approach, and indeed, different police departments have implemented their
own strategies. I focus on these four-prevention, problem-oriented policing, environmental
design, and partnership-because they are central to community policing theory and practice and,
crucially, they constitute a clear break from past practices.
25 See Skogan and Roth, Introduction at xxi (cited in note 19) ("Community-based prevention remains
an active enterprise to this day. Now it is more commonly called 'situational' prevention, and it
encompasses both resident and police strategies, along with an emphasis on building design,
neighborhood layout, and 'designing out' crime in the manufacture of products such as
automobiles.").
26 Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Scope, 4 Crime & Just
225, 225 (1983).
27 See Skogan and Roth, Introduction at xxi (cited in note 19).
28 See generally Melvin Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum L R 1253 (1999)
(examining the relationship between law and norms through three core aspects of corporate law:
corporate governance, fiduciary duties, and takeovers). Michael P. Vandenbergh applies social
norms to environmental regulations:
Studies of tax compliance also support these findings at an individual level. An
early study employed questions designed to focus the taxpayer on either
deterrence (the prospect of being audited or punished) or on the taxpayer's
internal norms of law compliance. The authors concluded that appeals to
Vol. 13 No. 1186
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The rise in popularity of environmental "nudges" designed to guide behavior has
been seen in a number of fields, including public policy,29 education,3 0 foreign
development," and even warfare.32 If cars could be designed to encourage seat-
belt use (with blinking notifications, alarm bells, etc.) and roads can be designed
to discourage speeding (with speed bumps, for example), perhaps then
neighborhoods and housing projects could also be designed to discourage
criminal behavior." Clarke attributes the situational turn to a study that
identified that the likelihood of juvenile offenders breaking probation depended
more on the design of the probation program than on the characteristics or
background of the juvenile, prompting scholars to ask: "If institutional
misconduct could in theory be controlled by manipulating situational factors . . .
[perhaps] the same might be true of other, everyday forms of crime."34
The broken windows theory is one of the better-known aspects of crime
control through environmental design. According to the controversial theory,
criminals respond to social cues about law-abidingness in a particular
internal norms appeared to increase compliance levels, but threats of formal
sanctions had little or no impact on compliance levels.
Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 Stan
Envir LJ 55, 133-34 (2003).
29 See generally Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improing Dedsions About Health, Wealth, and
Happiness (Yale 2008).
30 See generally Edward G. Carr, et al, Positive Behavior Support: Evolution of an Applied Science, 4 J
Positive Beh Interv 4 (2002) (discussing positive behavior support, an "applied science that uses
educational and systems change methods to enhance quality of life and minimize problem
behavior"). See also Donald M. Baer, Montrose M. Wolf, and Todd R. Risley, Some Current
Dimensions ofApplied Behavior Analysis, 1 J Applied Beh Analysis 91, 96 (1968) (discussing applied
behavior analysis, in which behavior is observed when influencing variables are controlled and
manipulated); George Sugai and Robert R. Horner, A Promising Approach for Expandin and
Sustaining School-Wide Positive Behavior Support, 35 School Psych Rev 245, 255 (2006) (advocating the
use of school-wide positive behavior support, an integrative behaviorally based approach to
problem behavior among students).
31 See generally Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking ofther Way
to Fght Global Povery (PublicAffairs 2011) (giving an overview of behavioral economics applied to
development economics, and in particular, the rise of the randomized controlled trial as a means
of testing development programs); Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel, More Than Good Intentions: How a
New Economics is Helping to Solve Global Poverty (Dutton 2011).
32 See Kristian Williams, The Other Side of the COIN: Counterinsurgeng and Community Policing, 3
Interface 81, 90-91 (2011) (noting the striking similarities between community policing and
counterinsurgency doctrine, especially in the emphasis of social and physical environments as
mechanisms of achieving community support and guiding behaviors). See also US Army/Manne
Cops Counterinsurgeny Field Manual 5-50 at 174 (Chicago 2007).
33 See generally Neal K. Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 Yale L J 1039 (2002) (adapting ideas
of architectural design for use in the criminal regime).
34 Clarke, 19 Crime & Just at 94 (cited in note 9).
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environment." Where the windows are broken and the streets have litter, the
message is clear: rule breaking happens here and no one cares.36 The broken
windows theory suggests a cascade effect where the presence of a broken
window, or another sign of disorder, signals the state of social norms and
therefore invites crime. Accordingly, broken windows policing often takes the
form of "order maintenance"-regulating smaller activities that seem not to
have much to do with crime per se but that may invite crime by signaling social
disorder, including, for example, littering, loitering, and public drunkenness.3 7
Because the disorder-crime hypothesis turns on the idea that disorder
indicates a social norm that no one is watching or that they do not care about
rule violations, one of the core strategies of "order maintenance" policing is to
express clear disapproval of crimes and any indication of their likely occurrence.
This has led to police tactics that include "flash mob" style shows of force in
which the police in large numbers descend upon a particular area suspected of
heavy crime solely for the purpose of being seen,38 citizen watch patrols,39 and a
significant increase in the use of surveillance. 0
But environmental design can also call for a wider range of interventions
beyond order maintenance policing. Environmental design calls for specific
steps to shape a situation to reduce the likelihood of crime:
Such measures include familiar forms of "target hardening" and property
marking; more sophisticated technology including intruder alarms and
electronic merchandise tags; the surveillance of specific locations provided
by employees such as shop assistants and custodians and other attempts to
capitalize on natural surveillance; exact fare systems, personal identification
numbers for car radios, and a variety of other measures to reduce crime
inducements; and some less easily categorized measures such as the use of
public ordinances to control troublesome late-night entertainment spots and
the separation of rival soccer fans into different enclosures at the stadium. 41
Environmental design, then, includes both infrastructural and social changes
aimed at reducing inducements to and opportunities for crime.
3s See Wilson and Kelling, 249 Atlantic Mag at 31 (cited in note 6).
36 See id.
37 Id at 29-30.
38 See John Wildermuth, Polce Surge Eases Violence in the Mission (SF Chronicle Mar 31, 2011), online
at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/citinsider/detail?entry-id=86130 (visited Apr 11,
2012).
39 See Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett, Community Policing Chicago Style 5-6 (Oxford 1999).
40 See Ronald V. Clarke, Introduction, in Ronald V. Clarke, ed, Situational Cnme Prevention: Succssful Case
Studies 2, 2 (Harrow & Heston 2d ed 1997) ("As illustrated by the case studies in this volume,
dozens of documented examples now exist of successful situational prevention involving such
measures as surveillance cameras.").
41 Clarke, 19 Crime & Just at 91-92 (cited in note 9).
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This new focus on social and physical situations is inherently behavioral.42
The situational criminal trend is "consistent with some psychological research on
personality traits and behavior that was finding a greater-than-expected role for
situational influences."43 Much of the situational crime prevention literature
draws heavily from social norms scholarship, in particular from the insight that
people respond powerfully to the norms of their social environment." As one
criminologist puts it:
Everything we know tells us, in fact, that it is formal sanctions that matter
least to offenders. Their own ideas about right and wrong matter most; the
ideas of those they care about and respect matter more. . .. Nearly all of us
grew up more afraid of our mothers than of the police. If the police cannot
get the attention of the streets, it would make sense to organize the mothers
to do it. As we have seen, this is in no way implausible.45
This move away from the traditional means of controlling crime toward more
social and situational factors requires close knowledge of and attention to those
environmental factors-that is, it requires an understanding of the situational
correlates of crime. Understanding and addressing these factors necessarily
includes a wider array of actors than the police and the courts. 46 This is a shift in
focus "away from the courts, per se, to look at informal social control, behind-
the-scenes processes, and quasi-legal structures in places where one wouldn't
have looked before."47
2. Expansive regulatory inquiry.
In order to identify where to place prevention efforts, the situational
approach emphasizes organizing the criminal regime around core problems
rather than around the crimes that may stem from those problems. As a general
matter, police under this model aspire to be responsive to community concerns,
based on the idea that community perceptions about safety are important
indicators of the likelihood that crime will occur. On this view, problems not
only emerge from criminal activities that may go undetected by the police but
are also seen as potential underlying causes of crimes, and therefore worthy of
police attention. This suggests that police should respond to and take seriously
42 See id at 95.
43 Id.
44 See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimay and Law Enforcement, 79 Or L Rev 391, 392 (2000) ("Social
psychologists have determined quite persuasively that the inclination that people have to
voluntarily comply with the law is governed much more by norm-based reasons than by
instrumental ones.").
4s David M. Kennedy, Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction 182
(Roudedge 2009).
46 See Harcourt, The Illusion of Order at 221-22 (cited in note 11).
47 Calvin Morrill, et al, Seeing Crime and Punishment Through a Sociological Lens, 2005 U Chi Legal F 291,
315 (2005).
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calls for service even when those calls for service are not clearly and directly
related to crimes.
This wider, more holistic approach to policing promises ancillary benefits
beyond crime prevention. First, this shift in police priorities can lead to a shift in
the degree of trust between the community and the police, partly as a result of
the typically large number of non-crime related calls to the police. In a recent
study in the UK, for example, researchers estimated that only 20 to 30 percent
of calls for service were linked to crimes.48 Studies have shown that police
responsiveness to core community problems is a strong indicator of public
satisfaction and willingness to cooperate with the police. 49 Second, the new
approach may produce large amounts of data, which can be used to direct public
resources more efficiently. Finally, problem-oriented policing is, in its ideal form,
diagnostic and reflective." The movement has, in the US and Europe, led to a
rise in studies funded by police and justice departments attempting to measure
the efficacy of various police practices."
A call for expanding police inquiry may be problematic where there are
preexisting concerns about police power.52 If a community repeatedly complains
about, for example, a liquor store that is known to serve as a hangout for
criminals, the new strategy might recommend addressing the conditions
surrounding the store (including zoning rules, liquor licensing requirements, anti-
loitering ordinances, etc.)-things that would have fallen below the police radar
48 See Adrian Leigh, Tim Read, and Nick Tilley, Problem-Oriented Poliing: Brit Pop, 75 Crime Detect &
Prey Ser 28, 44 (1996).
49 Yi Xu, Mora L. Fiedler, and Karl H. Flaming, Discovering the Impact of Community Poliing: The
Broken Windows Thesis, Collective Efficacy, and Ciirens' Judgment, 42 J Res Crime & Delinq 147, 147
(2005) (finding that "disorder has strong direct, indirect, and total effects on crime even with
collective efficacy being controlled for" and that disorder has a greater impact on levels of fear
than crime).
50 For example, Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) observes:
Strategies and programs can be assessed for process, outcomes, or both. If the
responses implemented are not effective, the information gathered during
analysis should be reviewed. New information may have to be collected before
new solutions can be developed and tested. The entire process should be
viewed as circular rather than linear.
Community Policing Defined 13 (US Dept of justice 2009).
51 See, for example, Michael S. Scott, Burglary of Single-Family Houses in Savannah, Georgia: A Final
Report to the to the US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Polidng Services on the Field
Applications of the Problem Oriented Guides for Police Project 1 (2004) (describing a research project of
the Savannah Police Department and noting that while the suggested reforms were not
implemented, gains were made in understanding the limits of the current strategies); Simon
Mackenzie and Alistair Henry, Community Policing: A Review of the Evidence, Scottish Govt Soc Rsrch
(Crown 2009) (reviewing data about the worldwide implementation of community policing
strategies for the benefit and at the request of Scotland's Department of justice).
52 This expansion of police authority raises other concerns as well, including time and resource
constraints, but these can be mitigated through partnerships, which are explored in Section II.A.3.
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before because "bothersome" is not the same as criminal, even if it nonetheless
contributes to community perceptions of fear and victimization. Of course,
there are obvious concerns about the wisdom of having the police serve as the
appropriate arbiters of community dispute. Indeed, Chicago's anti-loitering
ordinance-a situational crime control strategy-was controversial in part due
to this broadening of police discretion, and the Supreme Court ultimately struck
it down.53 Whether concerns about police power should outweigh a particular
community's plea for help, however, may vary on a case by case basis, depending
on the community's concerns, their uniformity, and the particular police-
community dynamic.
3. Expanded conception of police.
The situational crime control literature emphasizes the value of strategic
partnerships generally, including those between different public agencies, such as
the police and the local housing authority, and vertical partnerships between
public agencies and the community. For example, this literature emphasizes the
promise of partnerships between the police and other institutional actors that
directly interact with the community, such as departments of health, housing,
sanitation, food, and welfare, because they give the police more and often better
information about community needs.54 These agencies are sometimes directly
tasked with the core strategies of environmental design, such as ensuring well-lit
streets.55 Most crucially, these agencies often have more direct relationships with
community members, and in some cases higher levels of trust, than the police."
The aim of these partnerships is to extend the reach of the state's police
force beyond the bounds of the traditional criminal justice regime. In Chicago,
this meant that the Chicago Police Department (CPD) worked with city agencies
to regulate public liquor consumption, to prevent the use of abandoned houses
53 Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41, 63 (1999) (striking down Chicago's anti-loitering statute, aimed at
reducing gang activity, for being too vague). For an account of the controversy, see Tracey L.
Meares and Dan M. Kahan, When Rights are Wrong, 24 Boston Rev 4, 8 (1999).
54 See COPS, Communiy Policing Defined at 10-11 (cited in note 50) (noting that community
partnerships are crucial for access to reliable information and that "[c]ommunity policing is
information-intensive" and "[i]nformation is only as good as its source").
ss See Wesley G. Skogan, Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities 8 (Oxford 2006)
("Police partners frequently include the bureaucracies responsible for health, housing, and even
street lighting.").
56 As Skogan observes:
Beat-community meetings and the new plan to keep officers on the beat as
long as possible promised to be a vehicle for building familiarity and (perhaps)
trust between community activists and police who worked the streets in their
neighborhoods. For the first time, police and "the good people" of the
community would have a chance to interact in a context that could show the
former in a new light-hopefully as less rude and arrogant than many believed.
Id at 276.
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for gang and drug activity, and to ensure school safety." The police also created
a Strategic Inspections Task Force to conduct inspections for building, fire, and
housing codes in a targeted manner, rather than leaving each inspection to be
conducted by a different city agency." The idea behind these strategic
partnerships is that agencies outside the criminal justice system have different
relationships with the community, and they can therefore generate different
information and perform different functions from the police.
Partnership building is not just a matter of logistics; it is also about trust."
These police-community partnerships are often mediated by a third party who
has high levels of community trust, if not direct community involvement,
membership, and control. In many cases, this means a religious institution. In
Chicago, a prayer vigil organized by a CPD commander with the help of local
church groups was credited with increasing trust between police and
churchgoers.o Another prominent police-community partnership example is the
relationship between the Boston police and the local community leader
Reverend Eugene Rivers, who, "through his Ten Point Coalition, has been
credited as being one of the most important reasons behind Boston's stunning
success in curbing the number of youths murdered by guns."' In communities
where churches play an important role in community cohesion, they offer a
good starting point for police, namely, community relations.62
Trust is especially important in police-community relations because
outsiders often police the communities being regulated.63 Working together
through community-police partnerships is part of a larger move to broaden what
counts as police activity, but also who counts as part of the community. The US
57 See id at 180.
58 See id at 180-82 (noting that crime rates were lowered where Strategic Inspections Task Force
inspections occurred and that this depression was lasting).
59 See Meares, 79 Or L Rev at 404 (cited in note 44) ("[Inn order to persuade, authorities will have to
pay attention to the creation of the necessary social capital that engenders trust relationships
between governors and the governed. Such trust cannot be created simply by emphasizing
rewards and punishments."). There is a growing literature about the importance of trust for both
social and political contexts. See generally, for example, Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness
(Sage 2004).
60 See Meares, 79 Or L Rev at 413-14 (cited in note 44).
61 Id at 413.
62 See Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, Gang Leader for a Day: A Rogue Sociologist Takes to the Streets 104-09
(Penguin 2008) (showing how a pastor was in a unique position to negotiate a truce between rival
gangs, with the participation of local police officers and community activists).
63 Many New York City police officers, for example, do not live within the city. A recent bill was
proposed by city assemblymen to require that police live and work within the city. See Lawmakers
Want Cops To Live In 5 Boroughs After Facebook West Indian Day Controversy (AP Dec 11, 2011), online
at http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/12/11/lawmakers-want-cops-to-live-in-5-boroughs-after-
facebook-west-indian-day-controversy/ (visited Apr 11, 2012).
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Department of Justice Office for Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) defines community partnerships as "[c]ollaborative partnerships
between the law enforcement agency and the individuals and organizations they
serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police." 64 COPS
includes in its list of partners government agencies, community members,
businesses, and non-profit organizations." Community partnerships are thought
to be the source of the information, goodwill, and legitimacy that enhance and
enable the other crime control mechanisms of the situational approach.
Community partnerships can also demonstrate the weakness in police-
community relations. One study has shown how police-community partnerships
can crowd out informal community self-policing mechanisms where police
members are seen as outsiders." This suggests that it is not always desirable for
the police to take the lead in solving community problems. Whether the police
should take the lead, or be involved at all, in resolving a community concern will
vary by circumstance and location, but the point is that the situational model
treats trust and legitimacy as crucial to the success of the criminal regime-much
more so than did the older, reactive law-and-order model of crime control.
4. Proactive rather than reactive regulation.
Crime prevention is a core aim of most criminal regimes, but whether a
regime's prevention policies are reactive or proactive varies considerably across
criminal regime models. The situational model urges proactive regulation.
Under this approach, court-backed criminal sanctions are just one piece of the
wider regime-a regime that sees police forces as capable of having a proactive
and preventive impact on crime in addition to their ability to bring the
perpetrators of crime to justice. The centrality of prevention is explicit in the
situational criminal model: "[T]he community anticrime movement . .. played an
important role in establishing prevention as an important, and measurable, goal.
In a period in which police were still mostly reactive, coming to the scene only
after something bad had happened, communities were instinctively proactive."68
64 COPS, Community Policing Defined at 5 (cited in note 50).
65 See id.
66 See Brian C. Renauer, Is Neighborhood Polidng Related to Informal Socal Control?, 30 Policing 61, 61
(2007) (surveying community policing strategies in Portland, Oregon and finding police
attendance at beat meetings negatively correlated with levels of informal social control of
neighborhood crime).
67 See Roth, Roehl, and Johnson, Trends in Community Polidng at 15-18 (cited in note 20) (giving a
brief history of crime prevention strategies).
68 Skogan and Roth, Introduction at xxi (cited in note 19).
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A criminal justice system primarily focused on local legitimacy inevitably treats
crime prevention as a central goal."
In a sense, the emphasis on crime prevention animates-and justifies-the
other strategies adopted under the situational approach. It relies on community
relationships to identify community concerns; it prioritizes solving core
community problems, even where those problems are not, on their own,
evidence of crime; and it involves taking positive steps to mitigate the
environmental factors that contribute to criminal behavior. As the CPD's 1993
description of its then-new community outreach program noted, "It is the focus
on prevention through a stronger government-community partnership that
holds real hope for addressing some of [Chicago]'s most difficult neighborhood
problems-and for doing so in a way that is far less expensive than constantly
reacting to those problems after the fact." 0 Under the old approach, the metric
by which police departments were measured was their response rate and
response time to reported crimes. The new approach requires new metrics for
anticipating crime and addressing it ex ante.
B. Empirical Data
There is a growing body of empirical literature evaluating the efficacy of
police tactics common to the situational approach, and situational strategies have
had a significant impact on police practices in the last twenty years.7' However,
the empirical data regarding the efficacy of some of these practices are
inconclusive.72 This is partly because situational policing and associated strategies
mean different things to different people, and indeed, they are implemented in
different ways by different criminal justice systems. This variance makes it
extremely difficult to study the impact of the practice as a whole. The National
Research Council, reviewing data evaluating the efficacy of community policing
practices, "concluded that community policing [is] simply too amorphous a
69 See Meares, 79 Or L Rev at 404 (cited in note 44) ("A legitimacy-based program of law
enforcement will focus more on persuasion than it will focus on punishment."). But see Paul H.
Robinson and John M. Darley, The Utilify of Desert, 91 Nw U L Rev 453, 497-98 (1997) (describing
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system turning on the community's desire for criminals to be
punished).
70 Skogan, Police and Community in Chicago at 179-80 (cited in note 55).
71 See Mackenzie and Henry, Community Policing at 24-27 (cited in note 51) (comparing studies of
community policing reforms in different police forces worldwide and finding significant variation
in implementation and effectiveness with significant changes from prior practices).
72 See generally Ralph B. Taylor, Breaking Away from Broken Windows: Baltimore Neighborhoods and the
Nationwide Fight Against Crime, Grime, Fear, and Decline (Westview 2001) (surveying the empirical
data behind the broken windows theory and the community policing literature more generally,
including data from Baltimore that purports to support the theory).
Vol. 13 No. 1194
Toward a Situational Modelfor Regulating International Crimes
concept to submit to empirical evaluation.' 73 Despite this limitation, two core
findings stand out: environments affect the likelihood of crime, and the
situational approach, by seeking to regulate those environments, calls attention
to important and under-appreciated avenues for regulating crime.
Experimental evidence strongly suggests that environmental factors-such
as litter, graffiti, and other indicators of disorder-contribute to the likelihood of
rule-breaking behavior.74 It may therefore be reasonable to assume that
regulatory strategies aimed at these environmental factors would have an effect
on crime." Indeed, there is evidence that in specific instances where situational
policing strategies were implemented, significant reductions in crime occurred.
In one study, experimenters conducted a randomized control trial on twenty-
four high crime areas in Newark, New Jersey." The crime spots were matched
into twelve similar pairs (high violent crime/high violent crime; high burglary
rate/high burglary rate), and then one of each pair was randomly assigned to
receive problem-oriented policing, which included all of the situational tactics
discussed above. By the end of the experimental period, violent crimes were
significantly down in the experimental groups as compared to the control
groups. Yet analyzing the efficacy of these programs at the city or national level
has been challenging. Crime rates in major cities implementing situational
73 See Wesley G. Skogan, The Promise of Community Poling, in David Weisburd and Anthony A.
Braga, Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives 27, 45 (Cambridge 2006). The amorphous quality of
situational policing depends in part upon whether the definition includes each of the different
situational components described.
74 See Kees Keizer, Siegwart Lindenberg, and Linda Steg, The Spreading ofDisorder, 322 Science 1681,
1681 (2008) (reporting the results of six field experiments demonstrating that when people
witness another person breaking a rule, they are more inclined to also break that rule, and that this
cascade causes disorder to spread); Robert B. Cialdini, Raymond R. Reno, and Carl A. Kallgren, A
Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J
Personality & Soc Psych 1015, 1019 (1990) (reporting the results of an experiment showing that
descriptive norms-how others behave-can affect rule breaking behavior independent of
injunctive norms-how others approve or disapprove of the behavior).
75 Kahan states:
[L]aws that shape individuals' perceptions of each others' beliefs and
intentions, for example, may often turn out to be the most cost-effective
means of deterring crime. Cracking down on aggressive panhandling,
prostitution, and open gang activity and other visible signs of disorder may be
justifiable on this ground, since disorderly behavior and the law's response to
it are cues about the community's attitude toward more serious forms of
criminal wrongdoing.
83 Va L Rev at 351 (cited in note 4).
76 See Anthony A. Braga, et al, Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomited Controlled
E4eriment, 37 Criminol 541, 550, 561 (1999).
77 Id at 550.
78 Id at 561.
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strategies fell drastically after the introduction of those policies." However,
crime rates also fell in other cities that had not fully implemented the situational
approach, suggesting that there may have been other explanations for the drop
in crime rates.so Meanwhile, studies of order maintenance policing alone,
measured at the city level, have not demonstrated a significant effect on violent
crime rates.
Just as troubling is the lack of a clear causal mechanism through which
these situational strategies are thought to work. It could be, as one recent
treatment suggests, a number of things: that by going after small crimes, bigger
crimes are dissuaded; or that by improving the physical environment, potential
criminals assume there is more law enforcement in the area.82 It remains unclear
which, if any, of these mechanisms explains the power of the environmental
approach to regulating crime. One recent randomized trial, finding a significant
reduction in crime where situational policing was implemented, attributed the
biggest impact on crime reduction to environmental changes such as street
cleaning, rather than to misdemeanor arrests.83 Moreover, the most compelling
critiques of situational policing tactics have focused in particular on "zero-
tolerance" policies, a particularly denuded approach to situational crime
control.84
Even if one particular police strategy were found to have shortcomings-
as the empirical literature suggests order maintenance policing does-dismissing
the entire trend would miss one of the central contributions of the situational
approach, which is to expand the regulatory lens beyond the individual criminal
and toward criminal environments. One can accept this broader lens without
accepting any particular crime control tactic contained therein. Indeed, perhaps
one of the more limiting aspects of the situational theory in criminology
generally has been to essentialize complicated ecosystems-neighborhoods,
communities, cities-into a set of social mechanisms that can be regulated in
isolation. Regardless of the measured efficacy of, for example, the controversial
79 See Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden
Side of Eveything 128-30 (William Morrow 2005) (describing the broken windows theory and the
economic evidence against it).
80 Id. See also Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York
City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U Chi L Rev 271, 287 (2006) (summarizing data showing
that order maintenance policing did not reduce crime).
81 See Harcourt, The Illusion of Order at 67 (cited in note 11).
82 See Adam M. Samaha, Regulaion for the Sake ofAppearance **42-53 (Chicago Public Law and Legal
Theory Working Paper No 364, 2011), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1943174## (visited Apr 14, 2012).
83 See Braga and Bond, 46 Criminol at 599 (cited in note 11).
84 See generally Harcourt, The Illusion of Order (cited in note 11) (raising concerns about zero-
tolerance policing and the data used to support its implementation).
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order maintenance tactics of the New York City Police Department in the
19 90s, the environmental turn may usefully guide the conceptual and practical
development of criminal regimes more generally, in particular by offering insight
into the relationship between punishment and prevention."
The study of situational policies also produces valuable information about
the costs of those policies. For example, the more damning critiques of broken
windows policing suggest, among other things, that it amplifies the power of the
state in dangerous ways, producing a discriminatory impact on disadvantaged
communities; it risks crowding out more informal mechanisms of social control;
and finally, it is doomed to failure without significant changes in the courts in
the form of revised sentencing regimes and court procedures." These concerns
about situational crime control are real, and they should be carefully considered
by international regime designers. Not only do these insights suggest mistakes to
avoid at the level of policy, but by identifying where and how ex ante crime
control strategies are incompatible with or undermine ex post crime control
mechanisms such as trials, they promise to illuminate and enrich our current
understanding of the relationship between prevention and punishment in a given
criminal regime."
III. THE EXCEPTIONAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
REGIME
Conventional wisdom holds that international criminal law is different in
kind from domestic criminal law. Not only is international criminal law
distinguishable by its size and gravity, but the individuals who commit such
crimes are often motivated by different considerations than those that motivate
domestic criminals. For example, genocidaires are motivated by ideational
factors while many domestic criminals, such as automobile thieves or burglars,
simply are not." This Section considers these important distinctions and then
85 For a recent summary of the New York City order maintenance policies and the associated
empirical literature, see Samaha, Regulation for the Sake ofAppearance at **42-53 (cited in note 82)
(developing three theories for understanding the relationship between the reality and the
appearance of regulation and applying those theories to the trend of broken windows policing).
See also Section V.
86 See, for example, K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 271, 291-92 (2009) (arguing that strict,
zero-tolerance order maintenance policing has harmful effects on minority groups).
87 See David Thacher, Order Maintenance Reconsidered: Moving Beyond Strong Causal Reasoning, 94 J Crim
L & Criminol 381, 381 (2004) (arguing for a more expansive approach to order maintenance
policing).
88 For a review of empirical work on genocide, identifying in particular the prominent role of
ideational factors, see generally Scott Straus, Second-Generation Comparative Research on Genocide, 59
World Pol 476 (April 2007) (reviewing recent studies of genocide, several of which suggest that
ideational factors are a crucial component in genocide).
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evaluates whether they are distinctions that make a difference for the purpose of
applying the situational approach to international criminal law.
A. Exceptional Crimes
The core crimes of international criminal law-genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity-are, with a few exceptions, large-scale crimes." The
sheer size of the crimes and their impacts may distinguish them from domestic
crimes that, whether they are crimes of opportunity, such as robberies and
burglaries, or more serious crimes like murder and rape, individually affect a
much smaller number of people. This has led scholars to reflect that the gravity
of international crimes and their collective dynamics make them distinct from
their constituent domestic crimes, such as rape, assault, and murder.
International criminal tribunals have reiterated this position in defending their
own jurisdiction. For example, when the government of Norway offered to try
an accused genocidaire in its protective custody, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) rejected the transfer request on the ground that
Norway had not incorporated genocide into its national criminal code; a
conviction for murder, the ICTR ruled, would not suffice.90
There is also a contextual element to international crimes that is rarely
present in domestic crimes.9' Many international crimes occur in a context of
armed conflict or some other similarly transformative event, and the definitions
of the crimes reflect this context:
[T]he killing of a civilian will be considered a war crime if "[t]he conduct
took place in the context of and was associated with" an armed conflict; a
crime against humanity if "committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack;" or an act of genocide if "committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." 92
Most domestic crimes are not defined so as to include such contextual
requirements. These contextual elements speak to the widespread and collective
nature of some international crimes. The collective nature inherent in mass
atrocities may call into question the applicability of justice mechanisms that seek
to individuate justice. Indeed, it has been suggested that the modern criminal
89 Some war crimes, for example, are not large scale. Nor are all crimes against humanity large scale.
Given the gravity requirement and the track record of the ICC, however, the crimes most likely to
be pursued by an international tribunal are large in scale.
90 Prosecutor v Bagaraga.a, Decision on the Prosecution's Motion for Referral to the Kingdom of
Norway, 2005-86-R1lbis, 1 16 (JCTR 2006). See also William Schabas, An Introduction to the
International Criminal Court 197-98 (Cambridge 4th ed 2011).
91 See Adil Ahmad Haque, International Crime: In Context and In Contrast, in R.A. Duff, et al, eds, The
Stmetures of the Criminal Law 106, 106-26 (Oxford 2011).
92 Id at 106-07.
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trial, which is oriented around the culpability of the individual and not the group,
may be unsuited to address the collective dynamics of mass atrocity.93
Additionally, international crimes often have an ideological component that
most domestic crimes do not. Studies of genocide suggest that ideational factors
play a crucial component in its commission,9 4 and the crime itself is defined to
include the "intent to destroy" a persecuted group.93 Persecution as a crime
against humanity also has such a requirement built into its definition.96 With the
exception of a handful of crimes-for example, hate crimes-most domestic
crimes do not contain a similar ideological element. There are international
crimes, such as many war crimes, that do not require ideological motivations.
But war crimes may also be motivated by very different considerations than
those that drive most domestic crimes, including strategic concerns. Of course,
not all international crimes are distinct from domestic crimes; in the case of
terrorism, for examle, the prohibited act can in fact be both an international
and domestic crime. ' But as a general matter, the foregoing distinctions separate
most international crimes from their domestic counterparts.
B. Evaluating the Distinctions
Do these distinctions make a difference for the purposes of determining
the applicability of the situational approach? No doubt the scale of the crimes
and the motivations of the actors matter for determining the morality of the acts
or the kinds of sanctions called for in a retributive scheme. But it is less clear
that these differences preclude the application of the situational approach to
crime prevention. Consider two forms of this claim: a strong and a moderate
version of the claim that the domestic situational approach merits application at
the international level."
The strong form of the claim is that domestic and international crimes are
not so different after all, and therefore, criminal justice insights drawn from one
scenario should be applied to the other." This would require disclaiming the
93 See Drumbl, Atrocity at 35 (cited in note 2) (referencing international criminal law's "preference
for the guilt of a few individuals" over collective guilt).
94 See Straus, 59 World Pol at 483 (cited in note 88).
9s Rome Statute, Art 6 (cited in note 1).
96 See id at Art 7 .2 (g) ("'Persecution' means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental
rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.").
97 See generally Cassese, 4 J nd Crim Just 933 (cited in note 14) (describing the evolution of the
international crime of terrorism, which had conventionally been thought of as a domestic crime).
98 Whether one takes the strong or moderate form of the claim will determine the granularity of its
reliance upon domestic implementation of situational theories.
99 For an argument that transitional justice-which often features international crimes-is not so
different from municipal justice, see generally Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, TransitionalJustice
as Ordinary justice, 117 Hary L Rev 761 (2004).
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significant distinctions between domestic and international crimes. There is
some support for the strong claim, with regard to at least some comparisons.
Consider, for example, similarities between the Robert Taylor public housing
projects in Chicago and downtown Freetown during the height of Sierra Leone's
civil war, two situations that are, prima facie, radically different. In both places,
rebel groups-in the case of Freetown, the Revolutionary United Forces (RUF),
and in Chicago, the Black Kings gang-besieged their communities and
committed a wide range of crimes. Both groups used violence to control
markets and territory in order to traffic in high-value illicit goods. 00 Both
"carmies" were built with ranks of disaffected youth, usually men, who sought
status and respect; both even spoke of their members as "soldiers.""0 ' Both
offered public services to the community, in some cases filling a governance gap:
the RUF in Sierra Leone created clinics in order to win the support of the local
population, and the Black Kings gang in Chicago supported community picnics
and a community health initiative.10 2 Both expressed ambitions to become
legitimate political and economic institutions.103
Moreover, in both places there was little or no law enforcement. In
Chicago, the CPD had no incentives to enter the Taylor homes. The police came
from, and were largely accountable to, a different community, and they had little
legitimacy or authority within the projects.104 International peacekeepers were
similarly reluctant to enter Freetown.10 In both places, the only crime
prevention was thought to come from the vague threat of distant arrests and
100 For a description of the domestic criminal law literature describing fights over access to markets,
see Venkatesh, Gang Leader for a Day at 34 (cited in note 62). For a similar discussion in the
context of genocide, see generally Manus I. Midlarsky, The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth
Centuy (Cambridge 2005) (describing a prospect theory of genocide that suggests the killing is the
result of realpolitik decisions, usually in response to losses-of land, of wealth, etc.).
101 See Venkatesh, Gang Leaderfor a Day at 77 (cited in note 62) ("You are not just foot soldiers in the
Black Kings.'.
102 See id at 48-49. For evidence of the RUF community programs and health clinics, see Prosecutor v
Sesay et al, Transcript of Decision on Kallon Motion to Exclude Evidence Outside the Scope of
Indictment, 2004-15-T, f 91-96 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Trial Chamber I (SCSL), June
26, 2007).
103 See id. For a fuller account of rebel forces establishing governance in civil conflicts, see generally
Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilan Lefe During War (Cornell 2011). In
Chicago, the Black Kings made a concerted effort to become integrated into Chicago politics, in
formal and informal ways. Venkatesh, Gang Leaderfor a Day at 73-74 (cited in note 62).
104 See Venkatesh, Gang Leaderfor a Day at 88 (cited in note 62) (describing how the Black Kings drug
gang provided a certain element of security for the community in Chicago's Robert Taylor
Homes, and recounting a particular exchange with a local resident: "'Whenyou got a problem, I
bet you call the police, right?' Michael said. 'Well, we call the [Black Kings Gang]. I call T-Bone
because I don't have anyone else to call"'.
15 Lansana Gberie, A Dir4 War in West Aflica: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone 167-68
(Indiana 2005).
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prosecutions .106 Even the criticisms leveled at both regimes are strikingly similar,
suggesting that they are backwards looking, out of touch with the needs of
disadvantaged communities, racist, politically motivated, and ineffectual.10
Indeed, the situational movement arose partly as a response to those criticisms
in the domestic realm. 0 8
This treatment suggests more similarities between domestic and
international criminal situations than the exceptional account allows. But this
strong form of the claim becomes weaker upon closer scrutiny. There are a host
of important factors that distinguish the Robert Taylor Homes from Freetown,
such as the ability of the CPD to enforce the law at a moment's notice, without
the community's invitation or approval.'09 Moreover, for all its harm, the Black
Kings gang did not target civilians in the way that the RUF rebels did,
sometimes destroying entire villages.110 These distinctions undermine the strong
form of the claim. Moreover, even if this particular comparison were
convincing, it would leave out a huge category of international criminals-those
waging violence on behalf of the state against its citizens. State actors constitute
a sizeable portion of international criminal defendants and fugitives: the Nazi
leadership put on trial at Nuremberg; the Khmer Rouge leadership on trial at the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia; Muammar Gaddafi and his
son, Saif al-Islam, on trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC), to name
just a few. These actors are different from domestic criminals insofar as they
have direct control over their territories; few domestic criminals control their
environments in a way that an autocrat controls the state. This difference not
only undermines the strong form of the claim, but it is significant for
determining the applicability of the situational approach to the international
106 The international criminal regime would later prosecute some of the RUF commanders, much the
way the criminal justice system in Chicago would prosecute gang leaders for their most severe
crimes. See Prosecutor v Sesqy et al, Appeal Judgment, 04-15-A (SCSL 2009); Prosecutor v. Moinina
Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, Appeal judgment, 04-14-A (SCSL 2008).
107 See, for example, Brendan O'Neill, That's a First. The ICC is After Muammar Caddafi-A Man WV/ho
Isn't Black (The Telegraph Mar 4, 2011), online at http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/
brendanoneill2/100078506/thats-a-first-the-icc-is-after-muammar-gaddafi-a-man-who-isnt-black/
(visited Apr 11, 2012) ("[I]t is very hard to avoid the conclusion that the ICC is racist."); Bill
Quigley, Fourteen Examples of Radsm in Criminal Jusice System (Huff Post July 26, 2010), online at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-quigley/fourteen-examples-of-raci-b-658947.html (visited
Apr 11, 2012).
10 See Jeffrey Fagan and Victoria Malkin, Theorigng Community Justice Through Community Courts, 30
Fordham Urb L J 897, 899 (2003) ("One of the recurring crises in ... many socially and
economically disadvantaged neighborhoods is the low rating by citizens of the legitimacy of law
and legal institutions.").
109 The political hurdles to sending in peacekeepers are significantly higher for a number of reasons,
not least of which is that the Security Council is not a single actor.
110 For a thorough account of the RUF's brutality, see generally Corinne Dufka, Getting Away with
Murder, Rape and Mutilation: New Testimony from Sierra Leone, 11 Hum Rts Watch 3(A) (June 1999).
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realm. It may mean that the situational approach offers little to a regime
interested in shaping the ground-level conditions in a state run by a ruler
determined to violate international criminal norms.
There is a more moderate form of the claim as well. This form suggests
that despite all of the important distinctions between the two types of crimes,
they both share one essential feature: they are sensitive to and influenced by
environmental factors. This claim is on stronger footing, as the evidence
suggests that environmental factors, both local and international, play a role in
the commission of a wide variety of international crimes.
For example, it is well demonstrated that failed states-that is, states
characterized by exceptionally high levels of disorder-are at a significantly
higher risk of genocide and politicide.'1 International criminals opportunistically
respond to this disorder. Accounts of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, for example,
suggest that social collapse not only contributed to the spread of the genocide,
but that the genocidaires intentionally emphasized that disorder was spreading.1 12
The deliberate distribution and use of radios by genocidaires in Rwanda is
thought to have played a significant role in the commission of that country's
genocide, and significantly, the radios were broadcasting not just hate but a
message suggesting that disorder was the new order of the day.113
Environmental factors have also been shown to play an important role in
the likelihood of war crimes. In a novel study, conducted with the insights of
weapons-bearing combatants, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) recently found that the common denominator across several combat
contexts where war crimes were committed was a lack of order, particularly a
lack of discipline and command structure.1 14 Describing the context, the ICRC
said, "While violations of [international humanitarian law] may sometimes stem
from orders given by such an authority, they seem more frequently to be
connected with a lack of any specific orders not to violate the law or an implicit
" Harff states:
Empirically, all but one of the 37 genocides and politicides that began between
1955 and 1998 occurred during or immediately after political upheavals, as
determined from the State Failure's roster of ethnic and revolutionary wars
and adverse regime changes: 24 coincided with ethnic wars, 14 coincided with
revolutionary wars, and 14 followed the occurrence of adverse regime changes.
As these numbers imply, several geno-/ politicides began after multiple state
failures of different types. In addition, four of the 37 sequences of state failure
followed the establishment of an independent state, either through
decolonization or breakup of an existing state.
97 Am Pol Sci Rev at 62 (cited in note 12).
112 See Allison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the StoU: Genodde in Rwanda 263 (Hum Rts Watch 1999).
113 See id at 57-70.
114 Mufoz-Rojas and Fr6sard, 86 Intl Rev Red Cross at 194-95 (cited in note 12).
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authorization to behave in a reprehensible manner.""s The study goes on to
identify disorder and the lack of authority as key contributors to the significant
gap between soldiers' knowledge of humanitarian law and their practices.'16
Not only do local environments matter to the commission of international
crimes, but international environments matter as well."' The likelihood that a
failed state will experience genocide is significantly affected by the political and
economic embeddedness of the state.118 One study found that "countries with
below-average numbers of regional memberships are three times more likely to
have ethnic wars than countries with above-average numbers of
memberships."" 9 Moreover, countries with low levels of international trade, as
compared to those with above-average levels of trade, are at significantly higher
risk of state failures culminating in genocide. 120 There is support for this idea-
namely, that the presence of a watchful and responsive international community
makes a difference in the likelihood of international crimes-in the behavior of
international criminals. In Rwanda, for example, genocidaires engaged in pre-
genocide killings specifically in order to test the responsiveness of the
international community.121 The sleepy response from the international
community suggested to them that they could get away with anything.122
There are many factors that play a role in the commission of international
crimes-ideology, ethnic tension, military orders, to name a few-that may
distinguish these situations from those of domestic crimes. Studies of both
domestic and international criminal contexts have concluded that the
commission of crimes does not turn entirely on the character of the criminals; in
both cases, environmental factors have been identified as key correlates of
crime. The distinctions that do emerge from this comparison are not ones that
clearly make a difference in determining the potential efficacy of the situational
approach in the international context. One can acknowledge the important
distinctions between the two regimes and still think that the lessons of the
115 Id at 194.
116 See id at 195.
117 For a theory of how states become acculturated-and even mimic-their neighbor states, thus
accounting for regional "neighborhood" effects, see generally Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks,
How to Influence States: SocialiZation and International Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L J 621 (2004).
118 See Harff, 97 Am Pol Sci Rev at 65 (cited in note 12).
119 Id.
120 Id at 67.
121 See Des Forges, Leave None at 70-73 (cited in note 112).
122 See id at 74.
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domestic criminal literature on the situations of crime have important
implications for the international criminal regime.123
The moderate form of the claim leaves room to acknowledge the
important distinctions between domestic and international crimes and to
incorporate those distinctions into a situational approach. For example, the
exceptional scale of some international crimes may mean that the environmental
factors considered by regime designers must also be large-scale-that is, the
relative unit of analysis might be a state economy rather than a housing
project.12 4 Similarly, while the motivation of the actors may matter for
determining their culpability, it is less clear that it would undermine
environmental crime control strategies. After all, one of the central insights of
the situational move is to shift regulatory focus away from the individual
criminal, whatever their individual dispositions, and toward the criminal
situation.
At the most general level, contextual or situational factors play an
important role in the commission of both international and domestic crimes.
One significant innovation of the new policing approach is to address
"neighborhood effects"-the supra-individual, sub-municipal level of social
organization and its relationship to crime.125 As a guide to prevention-based
policies for the international criminal regime, this is a novel direction for reform.
123 To suggest that the international regime might gain something by looking to innovations from the
domestic realm is not unprecedented. See Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal For The World:
America's Vision for Human Rights 74-77 (Belknap 2005) (noting that the presence of American
lawyers and jurists at early meetings to design the Allies' post-war policy played a significant role
in the design of Nuremberg and the extent to which the international regime was modeled on
domestic criminal regimes).
124 This is not to say that the design of small-scale spaces is unimportant to controlling international
crimes under this approach. One implication of such an approach might be the introduction of
security cameras in interrogation rooms on the theory that their presence will reduce the
likelihood of harsh interrogations, and one can imagine many other small-scale applications of the
situational approach. In fact, this was one recommendation of the Special Rapporteur on Torture
after visiting Guardia Civil facilities in Spain. See Follow-Up to the Recommendations Made by the Special
Rapporteur on Torture Visits to A.Zerba!ian, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Georgia, Jordan, Kenya,
Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain, Turkeg, UZbekistan and VeneZuela, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, UNHRC, 7th Sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc
A/HRC/7/3/Add.2 (2008). There is some evidence that this change led to improved treatment
of detainees. See Theodore J. Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's
Independent Experts on Human Rghts: Final Report of the Brookings Research Project on Strengthening UN
Special Procedures 17 (Brookings 2010) (concluding that the recommendation to put cameras in
interrogation facilities "ultimately contributed to improved detainee treatment").
125 Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, et al, The Socio-Spatial Consequences of Inmate Release in New York City *9
(Center for Urban Research and Policy 2007), online at http://www.curp.columbia.edu/
publications2/SocioSpatialConsequences.pdf (visited Apr 11, 2012) ("The so-called
'neighborhood effects' literature-a loose assemblage of social scientific studies on the
importance of supra-individual and ecological variables-represents one of the most fertile areas
of research.").
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C. Practical Concerns
There are other relevant distinctions between the domestic criminal regime
and the international regime beyond the nature of the underlying crimes. Unlike
in the domestic realm, where the executive is typically somewhat unitary, the
international criminal regime is subject to the political and practical dynamics of
an international order controlled by states' interests. These include, but are not
limited to, the lack of an international police force, sovereignty concerns, and the
general lack of enforcement of criminal sanctions.
There is no quick-acting police force in the international realm that
approaches what exists in the domestic realm. The Security Council, the
international body that officially authorizes UN peacekeeping operations, is
widely considered to be inflexible and slow to act.126 Regional bodies are
similarly constrained by state interests, though the collective action problem is
comparatively reduced there, and domestic electorates are notoriously
unresponsive to international crimes abroad, let alone warning signs about their
imminence. 1 7 The closest analog to the domestic police force may be the UN
Peacekeeping forces. The political barriers to sending peacekeeping forces into a
place of conflict are not insurmountable; indeed, the number of peacekeeping
operations is significantly on the rise. 128 Moreover, there are now regional
peacekeeping forces, such as NATO and the African Union, who may be more
responsive to the risk of international crimes in a particular region. 129 Scholars
have also suggested that there already exists a global police force in the form of
transnational networks of military, paramilitary, and police forces working for
some common goal, such as drug control or counter-terrorism.130 But as I
discuss in Section IV, these armed forces may not be the most relevant actors in
a situational approach to international criminal law, despite being the closest
126 See Muna Ndulo, The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Securipy and Reconstruction, 44 Akron
L Rev 769, 780 (2011) ("[R]esponses to outbreaks of conflict have been slow, often hobbled by
conflicting foreign policy interests of Security Council members."); Allen S. Weiner, The Use of
Force and Contemporary Securio Threats: Old Mediane for New Ills?, 59 Stan L Rev 415, 419 (2006)
(noting the consensus among scholars about "inevitable Security Council gridlock").
127 See Paul Slovic, '7f Look at the Mass I Will Never Act": Psychic Numbing and Genocide, 2 Judgment &
Dec Making 79, 80 (2007) (proposing a theory to explain the general reluctance of domestic
electorates to respond to foreign atrocities).
128 See Virginia P. Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Be/ligerents Choices After War 4-5 (Princeton
2008).
129 See Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era 228
(Kluwer 2000) (describing the rising use of regional peacekeeping measures in the face of UN
incapacity).
130 See Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelman, Policing the Globe: Criminaligation and Crime Control in
International Relations 163-65, 191-99 (Oxford 2006) (describing the rise of a global police force
consisting of transnational networks of local and regional police forces combined with some
national forces that have international reach).
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analogs to domestic police. There are good reasons to be skeptical of increasing
the scope of international peacekeeping forces, just as in the domestic realm
there are good reasons to think the police should not be the only or the most
relevant actors in the regulation of neighborhoods. The situational approach is
as much about expanding the conception of who counts as part of the regulatory
framework for crime prevention as it is reforming the role of conventional
police forces. Many of the changes called for by this approach can be
implemented by actors who, despite being quite unlike a local police force, play a
crucial role in policing international crimes.
Of course, sovereignty is a significant concern for the situational approach,
just as it is a concern for any international law reform. The situational approach
is likely to be less effective responding to a determined ruler marshaling the
power of the state to commit international crimes than a rebel group that is
poised to commit international crimes. A determined ruler can simply oppose
the imposition of outside monitoring bodies in order to cover up ongoing
crimes, just as they can resist arrest and trial at the ICC. But to say that a
particular international policy will face sovereignty concerns is not to say that it
cannot have any effect. Many states in fact invite the international regime in to
address international crimes. One benefit of the situational school is to identify
certain high-risk situations in advance and to craft intermediary policies that lie
between doing nothing and a full-scale armed intervention. Insofar as the
situational approach gives the international regime additional strategies for
addressing international crimes beyond capture-and-trial, it may in fact pose
fewer sovereignty concerns than the current strategy.
There is the additional problem of enforcement: international criminal law
is enforced much less robustly than most domestic criminal law. Many domestic
crimes go unpunished, but the regime on the whole is much more robust than
the international regime, which sees many judgments unenforced and the
majority of crimes unpunished.'31 This is a concern for some but not all
situational strategies. For example, it would not affect the regulation of physical
spaces that make crimes more or less likely; the impact of these strategies does
not turn on enforcement measures. But surveillance strategies may only have a
preventive effect if the watched party expects the surveillance to be followed by
enforcement measures. Ironically, then, one implication of the situational
approach may be a much greater need for full (rather than selective)
enforcement of international criminal law. This does not imperil the situational
project, but it calls for closer coordination between ex ante situational strategies
and ex post justice mechanisms. For example, situational strategies might
influence the selectivity of prosecutions, without reducing or eliminating that
131 With regard to the crime of genocide alone, there have been over thirty genocides in the last sixty
years and only a handful of prosecutions. For a tally of the genocides, see Jack A. Goldstone, et al,
State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings 43 (Science Applications 2002).
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selectivity; the regime might choose to be even more selective about its
engagements, while enforcing more fully in places where it has chosen to engage.
Selective enforcement of preventive and punitive measures is a tradeoff with
which the regime is already quite comfortable.'32
To be sure, the types of preventive measures described here face bigger
political and financial hurdles than international criminal tribunals. It is much
harder to garner popular support for preventive actions when the harm is not
crystallized.133 Likewise, where shame and indignation are powerful emotions
available to interest groups seeking to build popular support for trials, the same
emotions do little for the creation of prevention strategies. Yet despite the
foregoing concerns, there are several reasons to think these are not
insurmountable hurdles. The first is that many of the activities described here as
part of the situational approach-early warning systems, UN officers' seeking to
understand the causes of core international crimes, development projects that
address these root causes-already exist but are under-developed and under-
appreciated as tools for crime control. Addressing these problems does not
necessarily require a significant outlay of new capital or resources, but instead, it
requires a conceptual shift to understand this work as operating at the core of
the international criminal regime. Once that shift is made, a number of reforms
may naturally follow-but again, these reforms are primarily modifications of
existing practices and calls for greater horizontal and vertical integration between
existing actors.
Second, the political will needed to enact more significant reforms seems to
be available in a way that it was not before. 134 Non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have been putting mounting pressure on the UN to take clearer action
to create an international structure to anticipate international crimes. The result
is the nascent Responsibility to Protect project, which, while on its own is a
norm with varying amounts of support, is backed by a new high-level post in the
form of the Under Secretary for the Prevention of Mass Atrocity.'35 Additionally,
the Obama administration recently issued a presidential directive launching a
132 See Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, An Introduction to the Law of International Criminal Tribunals 17
(Transnational 2003).
133 This is a common problem for counterterrorism operations-convincing populations to remain
vigilant when the risks of a terrorist attack are not at all apparent and cannot be revealed for
security reasons. See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presideng: Law and judgment Inside the Bush
Administration 188 (Norton 2007) ("[O]ur success-the absence of a second homeland attack-
has had the self-defeating effect of enhancing public skepticism about the reality of the threat.").
134 For an account of the failure of political will in the face of genocide, see generally Samantha
Power, '4 Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (Basic 2002) (describing US and
international reluctance to respond to genocides throughout the twentieth century).
135 See Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc
S/2007/721 (Dec 7, 2007) (announcing the creation of two high-level posts tasked with designing
policies for preventing international crimes).
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new initiative, the Atrocities Prevention Board, which draws personnel from the
State Department, the White House, and the Pentagon, and which sees the
prevention of mass atrocity as a "a core national security interest and a core
moral responsibility of the United States.""' These institutions and initiatives
were created out of an acknowledgment that the international criminal regime
sorely needs a set of intermediary policies that operate after the collection of
data by monitoring bodies but before a full-scale atrocity is underway. The
situational turn in policing arose out of a similar concern for policy options
between doing nothing and responding to the scene of a crime. While it remains
to be seen what effects these new international initiatives will have on
international crimes, the situational approach may offer a useful frame for
examining their promise and their pitfalls.
IV. THE SITUATIONAL MODEL IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW
What would the situational turn mean for the international criminal
regime? In this Section, I begin to answer that question by identifying analogs of
the four major components of the situational approach outlined above. The aim
here is not to develop policy prescriptions for preventing international crimes;
such a task would outstrip available space and present knowledge. Indeed,
concerns about causality that arise in the domestic realm are even greater in the
international criminal context. Instead, the aim is to explore how the situational
model might explain and inform developments in the international context, even
at the level of research, if not actual policy.
A. Environmental Design
In the international arena, there are a number of activities that appear to
address directly the design of local and international environments: food aid,
economic development programs, and infrastructure programs, inter alia. Core
development work-ensuring that a community's most basic needs are met-
may in fact play a key role in preventing international crimes.' But these
activities are largely seen as lying outside of the international criminal regime,
and as a result, they are largely unaddressed by international criminal scholars.
While not direct analogs of domestic environmental crime control
strategies, there are several features of the international regulatory order, features
136 Directive on Creation of an Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board and Corresponding
Interagency Review, Presidential Study Directive/PSD-10, Daily Compilation of Presidential
Directives No DCPD200100549 (Aug 4, 2011). See also Helene Cooper, Obama Takes Steps to
Hel AvertAtrodies, NY Times All (Aug 3,2011).
137 Insofar as development work reduces instability, it may also reduce the risk of genocide. See
Harff, 97 Am Pol Sci Rev at 70 (cited in note 12) (referencing the connection between instability
and the risk of genocide).
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largely ignored by scholars of the international criminal regime, that are
consistent with the situational model. I will discuss two such analogs, the use of
monitoring and material environmental changes, and ask how the situational
approach would inform their contribution to the international criminal regime.
1. Visible monitoring.
Monitoring is a core tool of the international criminal regime, and new
technologies promise to enhance the regime's monitoring capacity. However, the
impact of these technologies is largely understood in earlier, reactive terms. For
example, a new technique known as "crisis mapping" draws on the use of social
technologies to make it easy for people to pass along reports of actual or
impending violence and to collate this information on a map or other useful
tracking tool."' One organization, FrontlineSMS, has developed a technological
platform that allows cell phones to broadcast information to wide numbers of
subscribers, creating, in effect, a radio infrastructure where one did not exist
before."' An example of the benefit of such an innovation is that as troops
approach a village, an early warning can immediately be broadcast to villagers
"downstream."m This tool has also been combined with Ushahidi, a new
technology that allows the direct overlay of real-time reports onto maps for the
benefit of understanding patterns and identifying areas of need, as was done
recently in Kenya to monitor election-related violence.14 ' These tools have the
potential to give communities autonomous monitoring capabilities even when
the state is either unavailable to do so or is directly perpetrating violence against
its citizens, including in rural and developing communities.142 Yet the promise of
these technologies is largely measured through the old, reactive model of crime
138 See Jessica Heinzelman, Rachel Brown, and Patrick Meier, Mobile Technology, Crowdsourcing and Peace
Mapping: New Theory and Applications for Conict Management, in Marta Poblet, ed, Mobile Technologies
for Conflict Management: Online Dispute Resolution, Governance, Particioation 39, 41-42 (Springer 2011).
139 See FrontlineSMS, FrontlineSMS Radio, online at http://radio.frontlinesms.com (visited Apr 11,
2012).
140 Developers of this technology have praised the fact that, unlike a radio transmission, this warning
can occur without alerting the oncoming marauders. See A Crowd-Seeding Sjstem in Eastern Congo:
Voix des Kivus (Ushahidi Blog May 17, 2011), online at http://blog.ushahidi.com/
index.php/2011/05/16/voix-des-kivus-a-crowd-seeding-system-in-drc/ (visited Apr 11, 2012).
But under the situational model, alerting would-be marauders to the fact that someone is
monitoring the environment is necessary for its deterrent effect.
141 See Patrick Meier and Kate Brodock, Crisis Mapping Kenya's Election Violence: Comparing Mainstream
News, Citizen Journalism and Ushahidi (iRevolution Biog Oct 23, 2008), online at
http://irevolution.wordpress.com/2008/10/23/mapping-kenyas-election-violence (visited Apr
11, 2012).
142 Mobile phone networks are available to over 90 percent of the world's population, and phone
penetration in the developing world is now at 68 percent. See Daniel Stauffacher, Genocide
Prevention Presentation, ICT4Peace Foundation *4 (2010), online at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
40964522/Genocide-Prevention-Presentation (visited Apr 11, 2012).
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control, as tools for documenting crime rather than as tools for ex ante
prevention. Development scholars and practitioners have embraced these
technologies as tools for crisis response but much less so for crisis prevention.143
International criminal scholars have paid even less attention to the crime control
promise of these tools.'"
The same can be said for new satellite technologies. In recent years, for
example, non-profit organizations have used satellites to track the movements of
rebel groups in the Darfur region of Sudan.145 Satellite imagery has been a
longtime tool of states, but general access to even the crudest of these devices
was not freely available on the private market until recently.146 Today, there are a
number of commercially available satellites, and rates have dropped such that
non-profit organizations like the American Association for the Advancement of
Science and Amnesty International can rent satellite time, as they did during the
armed conflict in South Ossetia in 2008, in order to document international
crimes.'4 ' These technologies are under-developed as regulatory tools. As the
Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Killings noted in a recent report dedicated
exclusively to the use of new technologies:
New technologies offer ... significant improvements in existing fact-finding
methodologies. Surprisingly, however, there remains an enormous gap
between the human rights and information and communications technology
fields. Little sustained work has been undertaken by the human rights
community as a whole to apply existing technologies or to study their
potential uses and problems, and far too little attention has been given to
143 See, for example, Patrick Meier and Rob Munro, The Unprecedented Role of SMS in Disaster Response:
Learning from Haiti, 30 SAIS Rev Intl Aff 91, 100 (2010) (detailing the significant contribution of
new social media tools in directing aid and finding victims in the aftermath of the earthquake in
Haiti in 2010).
144 One exception is the report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions last year. But the report is largely interested in documentation of and reaction to
international crimes, rather than their prevention. See Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN General Assembly, 65th Sess, Agenda Item
69(b), UN Doc A/65/321 at 2 (2010) (Alston Report on New Technologies) (focusing "especially
on the relevance of new technologies in tackling the challenge of extrajudicial executions and the
rampant impunity that attaches to the phenomenon").
145 See Convoy: Evidence of Heaty Miktary Activity in Kadugli, South Kordofan, Satellite Sentinel Project
Report (2011), online at http://wwyw.satsentinel.org/report/convoy-evidence-heavy-military-
activity-kadugli-south-kordofan (visited Apr 11, 2012).
146 See Eric Lichtblau, US to Rely More on Private Companies' Satellite Images, NY Times A26 (May 13,
2003).
147 See AAAS Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights Project, AAAS Analysis of Satellite Images
Finds Hundreds of Stmtures Damaged in South Ossetia Fighting, Press Release (Oct 9, 2008), online at
http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2008/1009geospatialgeorgia.shtml (visited Apr 11, 2012).
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the research and development of information and communications
technologies with human rights applications. 148
But even this cutting-edge call for new technologies in the human rights context
focuses primarily on the use of new technologies as tools for advocacy, early
warning, and evidence collection.14 9 Separately, in the international criminal
context, these technologies promise to provide accurate and detailed evidence of
crimes. As scholars have long noted, the evidence relied upon in international
criminal tribunals is often lacking.o Information technologies are considered a
promising new source of data collection and evidence for later use in
international criminal tribunals.'
The situational approach would suggest, however, that such technologies
have an expressive and therefore preventive capacity in addition to their capacity
for documenting crimes. The preventive impact of such technologies turns on
how well known and prominently displayed they are.' 52 Like security cameras in
a dark alley, the promise of these tools goes beyond evidence gathering. They
can send a clear and strong message to potential perpetrators that someone is
watching, and that may be enough to have an impact in some cases.'5 Yet
neither the UN's Human Rights Council (HRC) nor the ICC is cultivating, let
alone encouraging, the development of these technologies for this use.14
148 Alston Report on New Technologies at T 5 (cited in note 144).
149 See id, stating:
Some [new technologies] may enable the reporting of abuses in real time,
thereby increasing awareness of incidents and speeding up responsiveness and,
potentially, prevention; some provide human rights investigators access to new
types of data which may provide important supporting evidence of human
rights abuses; and others present new advocacy opportunities.
150 See generally Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of
Intemational Criminal Convictions (Cambridge 2010) (noting that the international criminal regime's
evidentiary requirements are deeply flawed).
is See Alston Report on New Technologies at 5 (cited in note 144).
152 See Clarke, Introduction at 20 (cited in note 40).
153 One of the best reports on the Rwandan genocide suggests that strategic interventions would
have significantly dissuaded and slowed the genocidaires, who were emboldened by an apathetic
international community. See Des Forges, Leave None at 468-69 (cited in note 112).
154 See Stauffacher, Presentation at *3 (cited in note 142) ("The technological advances are very fast
and originate more from civil society, NGOs and volunteers than UN and Governments. The
question is, how to crossfertilize the ICT tools and IM needs and standards between these two
communities."). Moreover, the World Summit on Information Society led, in 2005, to the Tunis
Commitment, which reads in part:
We value the potential of ICTs to promote peace and to prevent conflict
which, inter alia, negatively affects achieving development goals. ICTs can be
used for identifying conflict situations through early-warning systems
preventing conflicts, promoting their peaceful resolution, supporting
humanitarian action, including protection of civilians in armed conflicts,
facilitating peacekeeping missions, and assisting post conflict peace-building
and reconstruction.
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Under the current system, criminals may be ignorant of existing monitoring
and surveillance mechanisms, which limits the expressive and preventive
capacities of monitoring. The environmental design literature encourages visible
surveillance-with the aid of signs indicating that "this area is under
surveillance"-in addition to actual surveillance. Adapting this approach, the
UN could, for example, issue a text message or drop leaflets in a particular
area-for example, where rebels are marauding in northern Uganda-that read:
"WARNING: SATELLITES ARE MONITORING THIS AREA." Sending a
text message to potential mass murderers may sound like a weak foundation for
the prevention of mass atrocity, but consider that such "psychological
operations" are now considered a crucial component of modern
counterinsurgency warfare."'
Further legal reforms could encourage this development. For example, all
states party to the Rome Statute, as well as other states, could be urged to ratify
the Open Skies Treaty. That international agreement requires all signatory states
to open their skies to outside monitoring, with certain limitations on both the
monitoring technology and the number of inspections."' The treaty has been
ratified by thirty-four states, including the US and Russia, and is being
considered by a handful more."' The approach advocated here would call for a
greater push from the Secretary General and other interested actors to
encourage global adoption of the treaty. A similar treaty could be introduced, or
the Open Skies Treaty could be modified, to authorize the UN to conduct
similar surveillance in connection with reports of certain activities, such as land
grabs, food shortages, troop movements, or anything known to be an indicator
of looming international crimes. The success of these monitoring tools partly
depends on the perpetrators' perception of the likelihood of international action,
including an eventual international prosecution. Would-be international
criminals could, for instance, ignore the surveillance warning as not credible,
Tunis Commitment, Second Phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, Doc No
WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/7-E at 36 (2005). This led to a call for greater investment in the use of
these tools on the part of the UN. Various states pledged to "support the United Nations in
establishing an early warning capability." 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN General Assembly, 60th
Sess, Agenda Items 48 & 121, UN Doc A/60/L.1 at 138 (2005). Little has come of this.
155 See US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgeng Operations, Joint Publication 3-24, VI-3 (2009)
(stating that psychological objectives have "a central role in the achievement of [information
operations] objectives in support of [counterinsurgency operations]"). See also Eric Schmitt and
Thom Shanker, US Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, NY Times Al, Al 2 (Mar 18, 2008).
156 See Treaty on Open Skies, Art 1 (1990), S Treaty Doc 102-37 (2002) ("This Treaty establishes the
regime, to be known as the Open Skies regime, for the conduct of observation flights by States
Parties over the territories of other States Parties, and sets forth the rights and obligations of the
States Parties relating thereto.").
157 See Open Skies Consultative Commission, online at http://www.osce.org/oscc (visited Apr 11,
2012).
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given the small risk of an intervention, let alone prosecution by an international
body. But with every conviction, the international criminal regime becomes
more credible. More robust indicators and more robust surveillance, in addition
to the development of intermediate tactics, should increase the likelihood of
such interventions.158
2. Material features of the environment.
The literature on the leading correlates of mass atrocities suggests that
material conditions are significant predictors of the likelihood of widespread
violence."' While it has not been shown that the material environment causes
international crimes, this is at least a reasonable hypothesis for future empirical
work. If this hypothesis turns out to be true, improving the material
environment in a country at risk for international crimes might therefore
become a core aim of the international criminal regime. Not only would this call
for closer linkages between the institutions of the international criminal regime
and the core development institutions, it could also call for a re-examination of
the allocation of limited resources by the regime ex ante and ex post-that is,
funds used for criminal tribunals, as opposed to economic investment projects,
in places such as Sierra Leone and the Congo where material conditions are
considered core contributors to the conflict.'
This approach also invites attention to environmental effects at the
international level, that is, in the community of states. 6 ' It has been shown that
one of the strongest predictors of a failed state's likelihood of genocide is the
extent of the state's economic isolation. Data from a decade-long study on failed
states suggest that countries with below-average trade openness (measured as the
combination of imports and exports as a percentage of gross domestic product)
are six times more likely to experience genocide than countries with above-
average trade-openness.16 2 This evidence is consistent with a significant body of
sociological research on the effects of embeddedness in the world community. 3
1s See Parliabating States, Open Skies Consultative Commission, online at http://www.osce.org/
who/83 (visited Apr 11, 2012). I discuss this in more detail in Section IV.B.
159 Harff, 97 Am Pol Sci Rev at 64 (cited in note 12) ("[Alrmed conflicts and adverse regime changes
are more likely to occur in poor countries.").
160 See id at 59, 67.
161 See id at 62.
162 See Goldstone, et al, State Failure at 10 (cited in note 131). The funding for the study was partly
provided by the US State Department and the CIA, which merits mentioning, but the study was
conducted by a team comprised of political scientists, not policy-makers, and the data is relatively
uncontroversial. For a peer-reviewed article examining the study's data and coming to the same
conclusions, see generally Harff, 97 Am Pol Sci Rev 57 (cited in note 12). This data is also
consistent with a significant body of sociological work on the world polity.
163 See, for example, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globaliging
World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 Am J Sociol 1373, 1387-88 (2005) (finding support for
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Such a finding may call for efforts to bolster trade in low-trade states-whether
through reduced barriers to trade agreements, trade subsidies, or other
measures-on the ground that doing so could play a role in preventing
international crimes.16 This approach is inconsistent with current practice, in
which economic sanctions are one of the only intermediary mechanisms for
addressing states that appear poised to violate international law.1s Not only
might the situational approach encourage drawing states into international and
regional mechanisms in order to forestall or prevent international crimes-that
is, not only does this approach suggest a new intermediary tactic-it also
promises to enhance the threat of economic sanctions down the line. The more
international trade at stake, the more the risk of sanctions would be expected to
influence state behavior."
As we have seen, the situational approach urges attention to the
relationship between crime and its environment. In the international criminal
context, this could require rethinking a number of existing policies, including the
use of global surveillance technologies, the use of peacekeepers, and the design
of trade agreements, inter alia. Whether these analogs suggest more fully
developing the situational framework in the international regime will depend on
further information about the causal mechanisms of international crimes. As
more is learned about the causes of international crimes, the more specific these
reforms might become. The innovation of the situational approach is not to
suggest that communities be strengthened and environments enriched. Rather,
the innovation is to suggest that these activities are core components of the
criminal regime. It is no more innovative to call for better or more international
development work than it is to call for streets to be cleaned. The innovation
comes from recognizing the impact of these activities on the likelihood of crime
and then evaluating the implications of this for the relevant criminal regime.
world polity theory in the context of human rights and summarizing studies that suggest that
increased economic development contributes to improved human rights records).
164 Again, there is no clear causality between economic embeddedness and genocide, but the
correlation suggests such an hypothesis for future research.
165 There is a growing literature on the use of economic engagement as opposed to disengagement.
See, for example, Miles Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, Strategic User of Economic Interdependence:
Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait, 43 J Peace Res 523 (2003);
Michael Mastanduno, The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Tbeory and Practice, in Edward D.
Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, eds, Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives
on an Enduring Debate 175, 175-85 (Michigan 2003). For a new proposal for law enforcement,
consistent with the use of sanctions and rewards, see generally Anu Bradford and Omri Ben-
Shahar, Reversible Rewards, 12 Chi J Ind L 375 (2012).
166 This would not suggest that states be drawn into international and regional mechanisms ony when
they appear poised to commit international crimes; such a move would create a significant moral
hazard problem.
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B. Expansive Regulatory Inquiry
One of the critical-perhaps essential-tools of the international human
rights regime is fact-finding."' A number of different actors track reports of
crime and other violations and investigate their occurrence."' This is a crucial, if
limited, inquiry after a crime's occurrence. The quality of these reports varies
widely.16 ' The UN's Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights has
several Special Rapporteurs, operating under the HRC's Special Procedures
mandate, who track and report on selected countries and thematic issues."o
There are currently forty-one Special Rapporteurs, Independent Experts, and
Special Representatives of the Secretary General, and their thematic mandates
include issues such as "contemporary forms of slavery," "adequate housing,"
and "human rights and international solidarity.""'7 In addition, there are
thousands of NGOs, some quite powerful, whose core methodology for
regulating human rights abuses is fact-finding.172 These UN officials and other
fact-finders therefore play a critical role monitoring pre-crime conditions around
the world. Yet their work is largely optimized for responding to rights abuses
and other criminal events, rather than identifying those events ex ante. The
situational approach suggests several reforms for human rights fact-finding
practices, including rethinking the nature and methodology of human rights
reports, in particular the use of indicators as a technology for crime control.
Because reporting practices vary, and given the centrality of reporting to
the human rights regime, there has been a push to standardize those practices."'
167 See Frans Viljoen, Fact-Finding by UN Human Rights Complaints Bodies-Analysis and Suggested
Reforms, 8 Max Planck YB UN L 49, 51 (2004) ("Greater concern for implementation of human
rights standards highlights the importance of establishing facts about human rights violations.").
168 The HRC Code of Conduct requires Special Procedures communications to be:
submitted by a person or group of persons claiming to be victim of violations
or by any person or group of persons, including non -governmental
organizations, acting in good faith in accordance with principles of human
rights ... and claiming to have direct or reliable knowledge of those violations
substantiated by clear information. The communication should not be
exclusively based on reports disseminated by mass media.
Code of Conduct for Speial Procedures Mandate-Holders of the Human Rights Council, HRC Res 5/2,
Annex, UN Doc A/HRC/5/21 at Art 9(d)-(e) (2007).
169 Piccone, Cataysts for Rights at 18 (cited in note 124) (explaining ways in which governments can
manipulate the findings of the reports).
170 See United Nations Special Procedures: Facts and Figures, Office of the UN High Comm for Hum Rts
2-4 (2010) online at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/docs/FactsFigures
2010.pdf (visited Apr 11, 2012).
171 Id.
172 See, for example, Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practicallssues Faced by
an International Human Rights Organization, 26 Hum Rts Q 63, 67 (2004) ("[T]he core of our
methodology is our ability to investigate, expose, and shame.").
173 See Piccone, Catalysts for Rights at 35 (cited in note 124).
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In particular, a significant movement is underway to quantify levels of reported
rights abuses-so-called "indicators" of human rights abuses. 17 4 The benefit of
these indicators is, in the words of the HRC, standardization:
The use of a standardized methodology in the collection of information,
whether it is through census operations, household surveys or through civil
registration systems, and usually with high level of reliability and validity,
makes indicators based on such a methodology vital for the efforts to bring
about greater transparency, credibility and accountability in human rights
monitoring.75
The rise of indictors as a tool for the regime can be recast as a problem-oriented
approach to crime, insofar as the indicators are an attempt to identify patterns at
a higher level of generality than the commission of individual human rights
events and to link them to the likelihood of, or underlying correlates of,
international crime.'7 ' However, this is not the way indicators are primarily used.
In the human rights context, indicators are largely used to track reports of
crime, not to uncover root causes. They are primarily seen as a methodology for
measuring violations in a simple and efficient manner. For example, the measure
of "right to life"-a norm with many potential implications-can thus be
condensed into twelve specific indicators such as arbitrary deprivation of life,
disappearances of individuals, health and nutrition, and presence of the death
penalty."'7 The aim of this work is to help quantify an otherwise nebulous and
immeasurable norm. The HRC's report on indicators, then, suggests a narrow
scope of practical applications for indicators, which it sees largely as a tool for
measuring relative zones of need: "The basic objective in developing a
conceptual and methodological framework was to adopt a structured and
consistent approach for translating universal human rights standards into
174 See Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance,
52 Current Anthro S83, S84 (2011).
1s Report on Indicators for Monitoring and Complance with International Human Rihts Instmments, UN Ind
Hum Rts Instruments, 7th Intercommittee Meeting, UN Doc HRI/MC/2008/3 at 9 (2008)
(OHCHR Indicators Report).
176 The rise of indicators also presents concerns about the power dynamics between government and
governed. Christopher Stone states that:
In matters of government, indicators are instruments of power. They are not
merely this, for indicators can also be sources of insight and pride, promoting
good governance through inspiration rather than coercion. Still, the reason for
the present interest in governance indicators is their utility for those who
would exercise power in the work of government.
Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South, Indicators in
Development: Safety and Justice 1, 1 (April 2011). See also Merry, 52 Current Anthro at S83
(cited in note 174) (noting that indicators implicate power relations between rich and poor
countries).
177 See OHCHR Indicators Report at 5 (cited in note 175).
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indicators that are contextually relevant and useful at country level.".. This is
largely an inquiry into the past. The benefit of indictors under this view is an
objective way to evaluate trouble areas to be addressed by the regime.
In the problem-oriented approach, indicators of neighborhood crime are
identifiable, structural features that emerge out of the study of criminal patterns.
In other words, indicators would be used to identify underlying problems of
community concern that may play a role in the likelihood of crime-problems
that can then be addressed by a forward thinking police department or coalition
of public agencies."' Yet where the situational approach uses indicators to
complicate and deepen the traditional police model of responding to single
events of crime, the conventional use of indicators in the human rights context
appears to be to simplify data gathering and comparison.
The situational approach suggests at least two reforms. First, fact-finders
must consider more data than the facts of the abuses themselves; heuristics are
required. Infant mortality rates, for example-measured as reported deaths of
infants, under one year old, per one thousand live births-have been suggested
as indicators of material well-being and the general risk of state collapse.so The
State Failure report found specifically that "countries with worse-than-average
infant mortality faced roughly double the odds of an outbreak of ethnic war."'8
Data about infant mortality, under this view, should appear in reports by the
UN's Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, yet they do not.'82
Moreover, a review of reporting practices by Special Rapporteurs suggests that
the majority of reports are limited to the facts and circumstances surrounding
reported crimes-so-called "events-based data"183-and do not seek to address
wider patterns of rights abuse, a hallmark of the problem-oriented policing
approach. 84 just as some police departments now recognize that their field of
178 Id at 4.
179 See Scott, Burqlay of Single-Famiy Houses (cited in note 51) (describing detailed indicators for
community perceptions about contributors to crime and police performance).
1s0 See Harff, 97 Am Pol Sci Rev at 64 (cited in note 12) ("[Ilnfant mortality rates are a good
surrogate for a wide range of indicators of material standard of living and quality of life.").
181 Goldstone, et al, State Failure at ix (cited in note 131).
182 A review of the Advisor's reports indicates that they make no mention of infant mortality and
hardly make use of other known indicators of genocide, including ethnic minority rule, low trade
embeddedness, and past history of repression, inter alia. See Harff, 97 Am Pol Sci Rev at 64 (cited
in note 12).
183 UN Report on Indicators for Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights
Instruments, UN Doc HRI/MC/2006/7 at 1 25 (May 11, 2006) ("Events-based data (for short)
consist[] mainly of data on alleged or reported cases of human rights violations, identified victims
and perpetrators.").
184 See Piccone, Catalysts for Rights at 18 (cited in note 124). There are many exceptions to this general
statement. The point is simply that taken as a whole, Rapporteurs tend to be reactive.
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inquiry must be broader than simply identifying criminal activities, so too might
human rights reporters broaden their scope.
Second, this broader inquiry may call for open-ended investigations into a
community's own perception of its health.'s Just as the police learned that the
only way to uncover the indirect correlates of crime was to ask residents what
they feared rather than what crimes they had witnessed, Rapporteurs, NGOs, or
national human rights institutions (NHRIs) might broaden the scope of their
inquiries in order to better understand what issues plague a particular
community. This approach, which gives the community credit for identifying the
issues most relevant to its thriving, could reveal that extrajudicial killings are
closely related to another issue, such as perceived government legitimacy or
corruption. Whatever it uncovers, its promise is that it may reveal hidden
"problems" that underlie a pattern of rights abuses but that would be missed by
the traditional approach of focusing on reports of discrete violations, or even by
the modified approach described above of developing a heuristic or set of
metrics for deeper issues that contribute to rights abuses. The Advisory
Committee of the HRC could propose these changes, which could ultimately
result in further revision of the Manual for Special Procedures.
Such an approach provides a hedged strategy for addressing international
crime. By aiming for crime prevention through addressing environmental
factors-in many cases, quality of life issues-the regime can "miss" on crime
and still deliver significant gains for the community. For example, if the regime
were to expend great resources to address suspected key contributors to
international crime-determined, under this approach, by reference to empirical
evidence and through close consultation with community members-and have a
negligible impact on international crimes, it could still constitute a worthwhile
use of resources. In the process, these tactics may address food shortages,
prevent or forestall land grabs, and diffuse ethnic tensions. Insofar as the
international regime is considered a development institution, this seems less like
an ancillary benefit and more like attainment of a core goal of the regime.
C. Expanded Conception of Police
There are a number of existing international organizations and institutions,
both formal and informal, that already implement many aspects of the
situational approach described here. In these cases, the situational model
proposes to connect these actors to the international criminal regime. This is
largely a conceptual shift, recognizing that many existing actors in the
international system play a key role in the regulation of international crime, even
if their mandate has nothing to do with crime per se. This would call for a
recognition, where supported by the empirical evidence, that development work
15 This investment is aided by the partnerships described here.
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done by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), food security
work done by the World Food Program (WFP), and order maintenance by UN
Peacekeeping forces have a direct impact on the likelihood of international
crime. This shift would have real world implications. For example, the UNDP,
the WFP, and Peacekeeping operations, which currently have no formal
relationship with the major human rights bodies, could coordinate their work in
order to further the goals of the international criminal regime. Tightening the
link between various international actors, especially actors that do not have any
institutional or informal overlap, may make even more sense than the CPD's
tightening its connections to public housing and sanitation departments, because
these international agencies are not housed in the same centralized
administrative body, let alone the same city, the way that municipal agencies
typically are. Therefore, institutional links may be necessary to create synergies
that might occur naturally in a more centralized administrative setting.
Closer attention to linkages between institutional actors of this sort could
clarify the relationship between the international criminal regime and the human
rights regime. There is significant overlap between the two regimes. Both are
international legal orders that seek to regulate individual as well as state behavior,
and many international crimes are in fact human rights abuses.18 ' The
international criminal regime is typically taught as a subsidiary of the human
rights regime; indeed, international tribunals are a standard component of an
introductory international human rights course.1 But core components of the
human rights regime, like the economic, social, and cultural rights framework,
are hardly mentioned in a typical course on international criminal law."8 To the
extent that food security, economic opportunity, and civil and political rights
contribute to the risk of international crime, as some scholarship suggests,"'
addressing these needs is a crucial aspect of the regime's aspiration of crime
prevention.
One promise of such partnerships is that they could encourage
development of economic, civil, and political rights. The current, court-centric
186 See Sergei Vasilev, Applicability of International Fair Trial Standards in International Criminal Proceedings:
Between Universalism and Contextuality (SIM Special Edition on Human Rights and International
Criminal Law 2008), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1718960
(visited Apr 11, 2012).
187 See, for example, International Human Rights Law Syllabus, NYU Law School (Spring 2011) (on
file with Author).
18 See generally, for example, Henry Steiner, Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman, eds, International
Human Rghts in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Materials (Oxford 3d ed 2007) (discussing the
international criminal regime as a component of the international human rights regime). Compare
M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed, International CriminalLaw (Martinus Nijhoff 3d ed 2008).
189 For an account that difficult life conditions generally contribute to conflict and the likelihood of
genocide, see generally Ervin Staub, Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Heakng and
Reconciliation, 21 Pol Psych 367 (2000).
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approach to regulating international crimes focuses on rights violations, which
requires attention to violators. This narrow focus on enforcing the law against
violators has obscured wider questions about the human rights regime. Many
economic and social rights issues cannot easily be pinned to a single violator, so
they are largely unaddressed under this model.' The promise of a wider
approach, one that involves more actors than the police and the courts in the
regulation of international crimes, is that it may provide insights into the impact
of those peripheral actors-many of whom are engaged in economic rights
work-on the likelihood of international crimes, which are civil and political
rights violations of the gravest kind.
Such an approach also calls for closer scholarly attention to and may
prompt rethinking the relationship between formal human rights institutions and
international criminal institutions, which often do not coordinate activities. The
ICC is formally independent from the UN's human rights bodies, such as the
HRC, and it has no formal connection with the Special Rapporteurs who are
well positioned to produce information relevant to the prevention of
international crimes. 9' The Universal Periodic Review, a new project of the
HRC to tighten coordination among the different human rights instruments, was
created partly to encourage cross-fertilization across the human rights regime.'92
But neither the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) nor the ICC's Special Advisor
on Crime Prevention is a part of the process.
The creation of these partnerships could be encouraged at many points in
the human rights regime, but this approach calls for something more substantial,
such as a coordinated effort-perhaps organized by the ICC's Special Advisor
for Crime Prevention-to encourage and sustain these partnerships, which are
currently largely ad hoc. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
endorsed by the General Assembly in 1993 calls for greater support and
expansion of Special Procedures mechanisms, while noting in particular the
potential importance of the launch of the ICC.193 No current institutional
arrangements suggest that the two are crucial to each other's work. 194 This
integration could be managed by modifying the Special Procedures to require
190 See Roth, 26 Hum Rts Q at 68 (cited in note 172) (noting that the backwards facing shame-and-
blame tactics of human rights practitioners make little sense in the economic and social rights
context because there is no obvious violator on whom to pin blame).
191 The first major review of the Special Procedures came to a similar conclusion. See Piccone,
Catalysts for Rights at xi (cited in note 124) ("The U.N. system should do much more to integrate
the work of the Special Procedures into their activities, programs and work plans and find ways to
connect their recommendations to funding priorities.").
192 See General Assembly Res No 60/251, UN Doc A/RES/60/251 (2006).
193 Vienna Declaration, World Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc A/CONF.157/24 (Part 1) at
20 (1993).
194 See General Assembly Res 48/121, UN Doc A/RES/48/121 (1993).
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that Rapporteurs meet with the ICC and with the UN Under-Secretary for
Prevention. For example, the HRC's Special Procedures manual currently
"encourages" Rapporteurs to "establish and maintain contacts" with national
human rights institutions and with civil society, both of which are specifically
identified as potential sources of information as well as partners for policy
implementation."' But there is no mention of the instruments of the
international criminal regime, either the ad hoc tribunals or the ICC. The
approach described here would call, at a minimum, for an addendum to this
mandate to include that all Rapporleurs, not only those working on international
crimes, be in dialogue with the ICC and also with the Secretary General's Special
Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide.
In addition to these international partnerships, this approach calls for
greater vertical partnerships between the regime and local communities under its
watch. There are already a number of community organizations whose current
scope of activities could be more tightly integrated into the regime. Examples of
these sorts of actors include local church groups, local tribal groups,
international religious groups, local and international NGOs, international
humanitarian aid organizations who often operate in places of political transition
and disorder, and corporations and other commercial actors.' Strategic
partnerships between the international regime and these organizations may be
more feasible as a logistical matter than a direct partnership between, for
example, the ICC and all of the various communities around the world at risk of
international crimes. There are also intermediary institutions that could mediate
such partnerships. One option would be for these partnerships to be mediated
through NHRIs in countries where such organizations exist. NHRIs are
emerging as a key component of the human rights regime in negotiating the local
reach of international legal norms.' Additionally, many NHRIs are enmeshed
in, and coordinate their activities through, regional and global networks."'
195 UN Hum Rts Comm, Manual of Operations of the SpecialProcedures of the Human Rights Council 130-
33 (2008), online at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/docs/ManualAugust
FINAL_2008.doc (visited Apr 11, 2012).
196 During the Liberian civil war, Lebanese traders in Monrovia were able to source goods and
materials because their networks did not depend on local suppliers. See Michael Charles Pugh,
Neil Cooper, and Jonathan Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of
Transformation 101-04 (Lynne Rienner 2004) (discussing Lebanese trader networks and their
connection to the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone).
197 See Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram, Introduction: National Human Rights Institutions, State
Conformity, and Social Change, in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram, eds, Human Rights, State
Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing NaionalHuman Rghts Institutions 1, 2-3 (Cambridge 2012).
198 See Office of High Comm for Hum Rts, OHCHR and NHRIs, online at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/nhri/pages/nhrimain.aspx (visited Apr 11, 2012)
(describing the International Coordinating Committee for NHRIs, regional coordinating groups,
and international NHRI conferences for coordination).
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In the domestic realm, police provide a focal point to facilitate community
partnerships among a broad array of actors. There is no obvious corollary in the
international criminal regime, a fact that may call for greater hybridity-that is,
quasi-international, quasi-national characteristics-in the international criminal
regime. For example, hybrid international criminal tribunals-tribunals like the
Special Court for Sierra Leone that mix components of domestic and
international criminal justice systems-may be uniquely poised to balance
international and local demands on justice.'" One could also imagine a liaison at
every NHRI with whom the OTP could coordinate prevention strategies, as well
as design particular criminal situations to be tailored to the needs of a particular
community.200 As I show in Section V, for an international criminal regime that
is frequently cited as being out of touch with community desires, taking such an
approach promises certain benefits beyond crime prevention.20'
Such a move is also not entirely revolutionary. International tribunals have
long been omnibus institutions.20 2 Indeed, these community partnerships could
be developed as outgrowths of the outreach programs already in place in many
international tribunals. The ad hoc international criminal tribunals have whole
teams dedicated to outreach,203  and the ICC has created a number of
204partnerships in places with ongoing inquiries.
199 For an overview of the strengths of hybrid tribunals, see generally Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise
of Hybrid Court, 97 AmJ Intl L 295 (2003).
200 I investigate this more fully in Section V, where I argue that one of the benefits of the situational
approach is that by decoupling punishment from prevention, it calls for closer attention to the
coordination of the two as independent levers for achieving different regime aims.
201 See Section V (noting the benefits to the international criminal judiciary of closer community
partnerships, in particular increased legitimacy).
202 See Jane E. Stromseth, The International Criminal Court and justice on the Ground, 43 Ariz St L J 427,
443 (2011) (noting the outreach capacities of the international tribunals which serve not just as
courts but also as development institutions). Indeed, the ICC has its own special advisor for
prevention-a person who may be in a unique position to spearhead such an initiative. See ICC,
Press Release, Professor Mireille De/mas-Marty Is Appointed SpecialAdviser to the Office of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court (May 27, 2011), online at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/785A45B4-54D2-4E93-A9F5-24E85148801A.htm (visited Apr 11, 2012)
(announcing the appointment of a Special Adviser on the Internationalization of Legal Issues to
the OTP of the ICC).
203 The Special Court for Sierra Leone has a dedicated Outreach Office, which has been hailed as a
successful feature of the tribunal that other similar tribunals should emulate. See Thierry
Cruvellier, From the Taylor Trial to a Lasting Legay: Putting the Special Court Model to the Test,
International Center for Transitional justice and Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme 27-
29 (2009).
204 See ICC, The ICC and Its Partners in Uganda Conclude a Series of Activities in Gulu District Marking
Internaional Criminal justice Day, Press Release (July 20, 2011), online at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/2FC2719D-50C2-4146-8A30-1A69D24F60AB.htm (visited Apr 11, 2012)
(noting the development of partnerships between the court and local groups).
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Of course, it is insufficient to say that partnerships matter; the novel
contribution of the situational approach is to say that actors other than the
police and the courts are central to the successful regulation of crime. It is not
that partnerships will single-handedly transform police practices and increase the
efficacy of the criminal regime. Rather, the embrace of partnerships is part of a
wider approach that recognizes the importance of social context in the
commission and prevention of crimes.205 It is an explicit rejection of the old
view, in which partnerships were seen as window dressing, were a burden on
core police practices, and were relegated to the office of public relations.20 6 In
the new domestic model, community partnerships are not just additional tools
for crime fighting; instead, they are direct mechanisms for crime control. The
situational model acknowledges that in some cases, the community where crime
occurs is in a better position to institute reforms than the police.207
D. Proactive Rather than Reactive Regulation
In the first phase of modern policing, under the so-called professional
model, the goal was to increase reaction times to reports of ongoing or recently
occurred crimes.208 This is strikingly similar to modern peacekeeping and
humanitarian intervention policy, which has been centrally occupied with
reactivity to the outbreak of international crimes. 209 A significant body of
scholarship is principally concerned with mechanisms for overcoming political
challenges that hinder the rapid international response to outbreaks of crimes.210
205 See generally Xu, Fiedler, and Flaming, 42J Res Crime & Delinq 147 (cited in note 49).
206 Lee P. Brown, Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials, 12 Persp on Policing 1, 45
(1989) ("[Community policingi involves more sweeping and more comprehensive changes.... [It
is the department's style that is being revamped. . . Although it is an operating style, community
policing also is aphilosophy of policing.").
207 See Renauer, 30 Policing at 61 (cited in note 66).
208 See Skogan and Roth, Introduction at xvii (cited in note 19) ("The professional model emphasized
responding rapidly when victims called the police.").
209 See Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? at 6 (cited in note 128) (describing peacekeeping as largely
reactive). When the UN authorized military force to depose Muammar Qaddafi in Libya in 2011,
human rights groups celebrated the rapid response of the international regime. As one reporter
from Human Rights Watch celebrated: "It was, by any objective standard, the most rapid
multinational military response to an impending human rights crisis in history." Ryan Lizza, The
Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy (New Yorker May 2, 2011), online
at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/02/110502fa-fact_1izza?currentPage=all
(visited Apr 11, 2012).
210 See Neville F. Dastoor, The Responsibiity to Refine: The Need for a Security Coundl Committee on the
Responsibility to Protect, 22 Hary Hum Rts J 25, 26-28 (2009) (reviewing the movement to establish
the responsibility to protect norm). There are signs that this is changing, however. Recent reports
by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon have emphasized prevention as a key component of
the responsibility to protect. See, for example, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to
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Even the nascent international norm known as the Responsibility to Protect was
initially built around a rapid response-that is, reactive-principle.21 1 The
situational turn suggests that as important as it is for the regime to be responsive
to reported crimes, reactivity on its own is not enough; the criminal regime must
anticipate and address, ex ante, the environmental correlates of crime.
In addition to the foregoing-partnerships, the problem-oriented
approach, and environmental design-the preventive policing approach aspires
to a greater cultural shift in which the regime evolves from being backward to
forward leaning.2 12 This is a second order change, namely a reorientation of the
regime's priorities, giving prevention as much attention and resources as
punishment. Instead of relegating the deterrence function to the courts, this
approach forces scholars and regime designers to consider other agents who are
poised to shape the conditions of crime. Such a shift in regime priorities-
indeed, it is as much a shift in priorities as it is a shift in policy-might
encourage a more aggressive stance on state sovereignty. This could take many
forms. For example, it could call for further modifying the rules governing the
relationship between Rapporteurs and states. Rapporteurs are seen as the official
early warning system for the international human rights regime.2 13 Indeed, the
HRC manual for Special Procedures describes Rapporteurs as playing a crucial
"role in providing 'early warning' and encouraging preventive measures."214 In
this light, they are the frontline reporters engaged in data collection and problem
monitoring. Yet they are hardly forward leaning. The same manual goes on to
insist that their "criteria for taking action" depend entirely on reports of rights
violations, not on early indicators or attempts,215 and country visits are
exclusively at the invitation of the state.216 Rapporteurs must request an
invitation from the state, often mediated through a third party, and these
Protect, Report of the Secretary General, UN General Assembly, 64th Sess, Agenda Items 48 & 114,
UN Doc A/64/864 (2010).
211 See Dastoor, 22 Harv Hum RtsJ at 28 (cited in note 210) (noting that the responsibility to protect
norm has been interpreted as a "responsibility to react").
212 See text accompanying note 206.
213 See Ear# Warning at 3 (cited in note 210).
214 UN Hum Rts Comm, Manual of Operations at 15 (cited in note 195).
215 Id at 38 (noting that actionable information largely comes from "NGOs and other groups or
individuals claiming to have direct or reliable knowledge of human rights violations").
216 The Manual of Operations also states:
A Government may take the initiative to invite a mandate-holder to visit the
country. Alternatively a mandate-holder may solicit an invitation by
communicating with the Government concerned, by discussions with
diplomats of the country concerned, including especially the Permanent
Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva or at Headquarters, or
by other appropriate means. The GA, the HRC, or the High Commissioner
for Human Rights might also suggest or request that a visit be undertaken.
Id at155.
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requests can be rebuffed and delayed, as they often are.217 A more forward
leaning approach would suggest making pre-authorization of these invitations
the default rule, one that states could opt out of on a case-by-case basis.2 18 Such
a small change in the design of Rapporteur-state relations could have significant
effects on the power of the Special Procedures mechanisms; indeed, there is
considerable evidence that default rules guide behavior independent of choice
preference.219
In order to further limit these pre-authorized interventions, they could be
tied to certain triggers that strongly correlate with international crimes. If these
interventions are truly preventive-based on triggers that occur well before the
commission of atrocities-the relevant state should have fewer reasons to block
the Rapporteur's visit than if crimes were well underway. The further out these
triggers run, the less pressure they put on Rapporteur-state relations. For
example, sudden increases in landholding inequality have been shown to be a
precursor to widespread violence,220 so with reports of land grabs in a particular
state, the international regime could immediately authorize a fact-finding mission
and give the state a chance to respond to the allegations. In the meantime, the
UN could train satellites on the state to monitor the situation from the sky. The
technological and political components of such a system are already in place;
what is missing is a centralized framework for understanding and developing
their collective impact on international crimes.'
In many instances of humanitarian crisis, the hardest policy questions have
not been about predicting or responding to the harm, but instead about
determining when to act and through what procedures. Lessons from the
situational approach may inform this as well. Imagine, for example, an escalating
scale of metrics that corresponds to an escalating scale of triggers for
international action. These triggers could exist in a step-like fashion, in which
advisories precede warnings that precede watches-each of which triggers a
different set of intervention responses. The default position of the international
regime is to intervene only after gross abuses of rights have already occurred.
217 See Piccone, Cataystsfor Rights at xi (cited in note 124).
218 See id (finding that standing invitations by states would greatly enhance the Special Procedures).
219 See, for example, Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 36-37 (cited in note 29).
220 See Manus I. Midlarsky, Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset ofiMass Political Violence,
82 Am Pol Sci Rev 491, 493 (1988) (showing that violence is closely correlated with patterned
inequality, which is defined as "a systematic departure of the pattern of holdings of one societal
sector relative to the pattern of holdings of another").
221 Such a plan should fall to the UN Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, who is
specifically tasked with such duties, when the triggers suggest genocide. But there is no similar
position for the prevention of other international crimes, aside from the ICC's Special Advisor on
Crime Prevention. The mandate of the ICC's Special Advisor should either be expanded or a
similar position should be created within the UN system.
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But if independent reports suggest, for example, an increase in risk factors for
widespread violence, including an elite minority group with a past history of
repression, low levels of international embeddedness, and high infant mortality
rates, a delegation could be authorized automatically by the UN Security Council
without any need for further state approval. Depending on what that delegation
finds, another set of actions may be automatically authorized, but in this case,
state or Security Council authorization would be needed to stop the intervention,
not the other way around.222
Like the design of situational police tactics, this early stage warning
system's design could be informed by social psychological insights. For example,
the psychic numbing literature suggests that there is a great risk that international
monitors and the citizens of states required to authorize an intervention will fail
to fully recognize the cost of great losses of life as the number of losses
increases. 2 3 A shift in default rules might be designed specifically to counteract
this problem. Consider how one such lock-step proposal might work to
minimize the harms of psychic numbing, harms that could inhibit political
action, in the context of an escalating conflict:
Say, for example, that valuations of life begin to drop off significantly after
10 deaths. At 10 deaths, a pre-authorized U.N. investigation would
automatically be triggered (implementing new reporting methods, as
discussed below); at 100 deaths, that investigatory body would immediately
acquire certain authorities. These lock-step provisions can be justified on
the grounds that any more subjective metric raises the risk of psychic
numbing. If such a system could be implemented, it could limit the
opportunity for genocidaire-states to stall international intervention under
the guise of diplomatic debate. 224
In addition to fostering greater sensitivity to early warning signs, a preventive
regime could also establish certain default rules (for example, pre-authorized
satellite coverage), which are automatically triggered after certain threshold
events occur (for example, land grabs).
Triggers have their own risks. They discourage creative thinking and
flexible problem solving by quantifying and systematizing complex human
political phenomena. Treating the task of monitoring the risk of genocide as a
checklist of a series of warning signs may increase the overall
22- For an account of default rules in international law, see generally Curtis A. Bradley and Mitu
Gulati, Withdraning fmm International Custom, 120 Yale LJ 202 (2010).
223 Psychic numbing is the name given to the phenomenon whereby people value lives less as the
numbers of lives at risk goes up. See David Fetherstonhaugh, et al, Insensitiity to the Value of
Human Lfe:A Studj of PychophysicalNumbing, 14J Risk & Uncert 283, 283 (1997).
224 See Paul Slovic, et al, Psychic Numbing and Mass Atrocity *10 (NYU Law School Public Law and
Legal Theory Working Paper No 11-56, Aug 2011), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1809951 (visited Apr 20, 2012) (applying
the psychic numbing insight to international human rights and international criminal law).
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comprehensiveness of the monitoring effort, but it also may increase the risk
that monitors will miss important events that fall outside the scope of their
checklist. In this way, the checklist risks complacency. But if the checklist is well
designed, the risks imposed by this complacency are unlikely to be greater than
the risk that without the triggers the regime will be either unresponsive or
insufficiently responsive to mass atrocity.2 25 Additionally, just because triggers
are deemed a useful mechanism for authorizing intervention does not mean that
such intervention will be called for in every case. The trigger would merely
resolve the question of authority to intervene, without solving the questions of
who and how and when to intervene.
Finally, consider a similar adaptation of the principle of complementarity,
which guides the determination of when the ICC can take a case. Currently, the
court is meant to "complement" domestic criminal regimes. The principle of
complementarity guides the regime's decisions vis-a-vis criminal investigations,
and the regime is only meant to launch an inquiry if a state is "unwilling or
unable genuinely" to investigate the occurrence of an international crime.226 But
perhaps the regime should also develop a complementarity principle for
preventive policies as well.227 Under such an approach, the international regime
would only launch a problem-oriented investigation, or seek to address
environmental factors contributing to the likelihood of crime, and so on, if a
state is unwilling or incapable of implementing these features on its own. It
would take more space than is available here to develop a full proposal along
these lines, but this is an example of the sort of doctrine that the situational
policing regime could develop to guide-and to limit-its implementation of
preventive policies with the aid of insights from the situational approach. An
abundance of theory guides the regime's ex post mechanisms, but the ex ante
side of the regime is comparatively under-developed. Fixing this imbalance may
do more than merely prevent crime; as I explore in the next section, it may also
call for reforms to ex post justice mechanisms.
225 Consider, as an example, the checklists used to increase the safety of airplane travel worldwide. A
number of recurring human errors caused a significant number of crashes. Today, the number of
crashes is reduced significantly because of the implementation of routine, checklist procedures.
See Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of Success 218 (Little Brown 2008).
226 Rome Statute, Art 17(l)(a) (cited in note 1).
227 William Burke-White has similarly proposed transforming the complementarity principle to be
more proactive and more forward leaning in order to prompt and empower domestic courts to
pursue international crimes. See generally Proactive Complementaiy: The International Ciminal Court
and National Courts in the Rome System of Justice, 49 Harv Intl L J 53 (2008) (examining proactive
complementarity and offering a practical framework for its implementation).
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL COURTS
One of the deeper impacts of the situational move in the domestic criminal
literature has been to call into question the exclusive reliance on punishment as a
means of achieving crime prevention. Apart from the effect this turn has on
crime, it can be seen as a reorientation of the criminal legal model, one in which
punishment is unbundled from prevention. That is, the new approach to
criminal justice is not simply a supplement to the old approach: the introduction
of situational laws and policies aimed at regulating crime ex ante can have a
significant impact on more traditional criminal justice mechanisms such as
trials.228 In this Section, I explore some negative interaction effects between the
situational approach and the older approach, and then I consider two types of
reforms for prosecutors and courts. These reforms might include small-scale
changes, such as shifting prosecutorial priorities at the ICC, as well as more
fundamental changes, such as rethinking the very purpose of international
criminal trials.
A. Negative Interaction Effects
The most powerful critique of the order maintenance policing strategy is
not that it fails to work, but that it has negative side effects when it is
implemented in the context of an extremely harsh and inflexible sentencing
regime.22 9 The result is a huge increase in incarceration rates.230 As has been well
documented in the US, judges and politicians face intense pressure to increase
the length of prison sentences. 231 The criminal regime is stuck with the worst of
both worlds: a large increase in enforcement (based on "zero tolerance" or other
order maintenance strategies) combined with an older crime-and-punishment
model reliant on stiff sentences to deter crime.232 This problem of combining
more policing enforcement with traditional sentencing structures may be a larger
concern for municipal criminal regimes than the international criminal regime,
228 Indeed, the community policing movement triggered a corollary movement in prosecutors' offices
and in courts across the country. See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Communipy Justice, 40 Harv CR-
CL L Rev 359, 366-67 (2005) (discussing the community justice offshoots).
229 See id at 390 ("Targeting panhandlers or prostitutes may reduce fear of crime in troubled
neighborhoods by removing visible signs of disorder, but it does little to solve the broader crisis
of legitimacy arising from the harsh practices of the mainstream criminal system.").
230 See id at 361.
231 See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics ofCriminalLaw, 100 Mich L Rev 506, 523-25 (2001).
232 See Howell, 33 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 274 (cited in note 86). This is especially poignant
because one of the aims of the original "new Chicago school" of criminology, a precursor to the
new policing approaches, was created out of a desire for "milder public order alternatives" to
harsh sentences. See Harcourt, The Illusion ofOrder at 38 (cited in note 11).
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which does not have a fully elaborated sentencing scheme.233 Since international
criminal law is under-enforced, with extremely selective prosecutions and
sentences that are frequently criticized for being too lenient,2 34 there may be less
risk of creating the same situation that concerns domestic critics. But there are
other risks.
The turn to formalize ex ante strategies for regulating crime may run the
risk, significant perhaps, of crowding out more informal, local forms of control.
There is some evidence that when community distrust of the police is high,
police-community partnerships not only will fail, but they will depress
community self-regulation. 235 Without knowing the level of trust that vulnerable
populations in general have of outside police forces, it seems reasonable to
speculate that the risk of similar crowding out effects is significant. To take just
one example, consider that peacekeepers, despite their high rate of success at
maintaining peace, have fared poorly on the score of local legitimacy. 236 As many
international criminal scholars have noted, local legitimacy is a prerequisite for
the expression of moral norms. 237 To the extent that the situational approach
risks further weakening the legitimacy of the regime, it might undermine the
ability of international tribunals to credibly express moral norms.
There is also the risk of cooptation and mission creep. Calling development
work "crime prevention" is not a shift without consequences. For example,
counterinsurgency doctrine-which shares many features with community
policing, including calling for the closer integration of security services with
quality of life services-has effectively co-opted development policy in some
areas of conflict. One result of this co-optation is that it is now harder to obtain
a grant for a development project unless that work can be justified as serving a
233 There is an effort underway to clarify and standardize international criminal sentences. See
generally, for example, Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International
Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 Va L Rev 415 (2001). Insofar as these efforts are aimed at clarity, they
hold real promise. See id at 471. But the situational approach suggests that inflexible sentencing
regimes interact in negative ways with ex ante situational approaches to criminal regulation.
234 See Jens David Ohlin, Towards A Unique Theory of International Criminal Sentencing, in G6ran Sluiter
and Sergey Vasiliev, eds, International Criminal Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law 381, 382
(Cameron May 2009) (noting the "natural intuition that the special gravity of international crimes
requires greater punishment" than those currently meted out by the regime).
235 See Renauer, 30 Policing at 76-77 (cited in note 66) ("[A] community policing style may not be
enough to overcome deeply entrenched attitudes toward the police in the most disadvantaged
communities and, at worst, may discourage informal social control.").
236 See, for example, Andrew Ladley, Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effeedve
Criminal and Civil Accountability on International Peace Operations, 1 Pol & Ethics Rev 81, 82 (2005)
("International peace operations constantly risk adding serious international insult to existing local
injury.").
237 See Damaska, 83 Chi Kent L Rev at 348 (cited in note 2) ("Mhe importance of considering local
responses to the decisions of international criminal courts can hardly be overemphasized.").
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security function.238 The same risk exists in the international criminal regime. For
example, if the delivery of essential medical services is thought to reduce the risk
of international crime ex ante, and institutional arrangements reflect this, then
these services could fall under the purview of the criminal regime and be
diminished as a result. This is especially important because one measure of the
legitimacy of a legal regime is its competence in the performance of basic
*239services.
B. Implications for the Prosecution of International Crimes
That the situational approach can have negative effects on the larger
criminal justice system suggests either abandoning that approach or making
accommodations. Many municipalities where situational policing has been
introduced appear to have followed the latter course.2 40 Empirical evidence
suggests that the introduction of situational policing strategies led to shifts in the
priorities of district attorney's offices and the practice of judges, to better
coordinate the administration of criminal justice. One study of four
municipalities over ten years during the introduction of community policing
practices found that the change affected judges and prosecutors in several
significant ways.24 1 For example, a county District Attorney "pioneered a
community-based justice program designed to target violent youthful offenders
for prosecution and stabilize the remaining population ... with a coordinated
program involving the mayor, chief of police, school superintendents, probation,
juvenile court, state agencies, prosecutors and others."242 In New Jersey, Judge
George Nicola created a similar program to coordinate his cases and the
sentences meted out with the activities of the local police.2 43 He also launched a
volunteer network in New Brunswick that supervised court-ordered conditions,
238 See Carol Messineo, The United States Military as an Agent of Development: Counteinsurgency Doctrine and
Development Assistance **17-18 (International Affairs Working Paper 2010-05, 2010), online at
http://www.gpia.info/files/u706/Messineo-2010-05.pdf (visited Apr 11, 2012) (arguing that
counterinsurgency approaches to development tend to lead to narrow approaches to both security
and development).
239 See Margaret Levi, Tom Tyler, and Audrey Sacks, The Reasons for Compliance with Law *1 (US
Studies Centre at the University of Sydney Working Paper Aug 2009), online at
http://ussc.edu.au/s/media/docs/publications/0908_1evi compliance.pdf (visited Apr 20, 2012)
("One of the most important antecedent conditions of value-based legitimacy is the
trustworthiness of government, based on positive assessments of leadership motivations,
administrative competence, and, [sic] government perfonance.") (emphasis added).
240 See Joan E. Jacoby, Heike P. Gramckow, and Edward C. Ratledge, The Impact of Community Policing
on the Criminal/Justice System 96-97 (Jefferson Institute forJustice Studies 1995).
241 See id.
242 Id at 9.
243 Paul B. Wice, Court Reform and judicial Leadership: Judge George Nicola and the New Jersey
Justice System, 150-163 (Praeger 1995).
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monitored court-ordered activities, and developed alternative responses to
incarceration.24 In other words, both courts and prosecutors have become, in
some instances, more community-minded as a result of police practices'
becoming community-oriented. By changing prosecutors' charging priorities and
tailoring courts to the community-oriented approach, the criminal justice system
gained "an opportunity to strengthen public relations; to educate the public
about areas of criminal justice largely unknown to them; and, to foster a closer
working relationship between their agency, the police, local business
communities, schools, and civic organizations." 24 5
By 2007, there were over 2,500 "problem solving courts" or "community
courts" in the US-courts that had explicitly adapted their procedures in order
to coordinate with new situational policing strategies. 2 46 This development is a
direct response to the situational turn in policing:
Problem-solving justice can trace its theoretical roots to innovations in
policing, particularly community and problem-oriented policing, which
attempted to replace traditional law enforcement's focus on responding to
individual offenses with a focus on identifying and addressing patterns of
crime, ameliorating the underlying conditions that fuel crime, and engaging
the community as an active partner.247
In the US, the Conference of Chief Judges and Conference of State Court
Administrators have adopted resolutions endorsing the community-oriented
approach and urging reforms to coordinate the administration of justice with
community policing practices more closely; the American Bar Association has
adopted a similar position. 248
The problem-oriented justice literature suggests that prosecutors must not
only adjust their tactics, but must fundamentally redefine their roles. The
ambition is to change the mission of the prosecutor away from simply
prosecuting crimes and toward solving problems, which is achieved through
strategic prosecutions, creative sentences, and partnerships with other public
agencies.249 Tiis requires that prosecutors "look beyond a myopic focus on
individual criminal transgressions" and instead focus on structural problems.250
In this model, the prosecutor actually becomes the central coordinator for
addressing the underlying causes of a particular "problem" or crime; "the
244 Id.
245 See Jacoby, Gramckow, and Radedge, The Impact of Community Policing at 8 (cited in note 240).
246 See Robert V. Wolf, Principles of Problem Soling Justice 1 (Center for Court Innovation, Bureau of
justice Assistance 2007).
247 Id.
248 See id.
249 See Thompson, 77 Notre Dame L Rev at 361-66 (cited in note 15) (noting the new roles of
prosecutors in the community justice movement).
250 Id at 363.
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prosecutor serves as facilitator and coordinator, linking previously disparate
actors and organizations in defining problems and identifying solutions."2' 1
The OTP is particularly well poised to act as a coordinator for such
horizontal and vertical partnerships. One implication of this research, then,
could be a significant enhancement of the OTP's reach. The OTP's mandate to
investigate "situations" is already inherently problem oriented.252 That mandate
could justify a prosecutorial strategy that accommodates the situational
approach, in particular pursuing lesser acts that might precede or even
precipitate the worst crimes. Strategic prosecutions, as a general matter, are not
at all novel to international justice. As Louise Arbour noted, "in my experience,
based on the work of the two Tribunals to date, I believe that the real challenge
posed to a Prosecutor is to choose from many meritorious complaints the
appropriate ones for international intervention, rather than to weed out weak or
frivolous ones."253
The situational approach thus could have significant impact on the OTP
and the types of crimes it pursues. Rather than only pursuing the worst actors,
the OTP could pursue actors who have not yet but are poised to commit mass
atrocities. This would require pursuing borderline cases and cases of inchoate
crimes.254 The OTP is limited in this endeavor by the fact that it has no formal
connection to the Security Council, international NGOs, or the human rights
bodies who design and implement ex ante crime prevention strategies-and who
are most likely to know which environments are dangerously ripe for grave
international crimes. A prosecutor in a municipal regime has much closer ties
and easier access to the agencies implementing crime prevention policies. But
there are signs that the ICC is deepening its reach and embracing a role as a
251 Id at 364.
252 See Rome Statute, Arts 13-15 (cited in note 1) (outlining jurisdictional, referral, and prosecutorial
functions).
253 Schabas, Introduction to the ICC at 176 (cited in note 90), quoting Statement ofJustice Arbour to the
PreparatoU Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 7-8 (Dec 8, 1997). Arbour
worked as Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY as well as for the ICTR. See Schabas, Introduction to the
ICC at 176 (cited in note 90).
254 As Schabas notes:
If the ultimate goal of the [ICC] is to prevent human rights abuses and
atrocities, prosecution for attempts ought to be of considerable significance.
But the history of war crimes prosecutions yields few examples, probably
because the very idea of criminal repression has arisen after the commission of
the crimes.
Introduclion to the ICC at 230 (cited in note 90). Yet attempts have only been charged twice:
Pmsecutor v Kony, et al, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony, 02/04-01/05-53, 12-19 (ICC 2005) and
Prosecutor v Kony, et al, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti, 02/04-01/05-54, 12-20 (ICC 2005). But
in another case, the ICC noted that if it had found specific intent, then attempts could have been
included. See id at 231, citing Prosecutor v Katanga & Chai, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, 01/04-01/07, 458-60 (ICC 2008).
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problem solver. How far the OTP can adapt may depend on not only outside
actors, but also on the ICC's own view as to its jurisdiction.
The international regime is limited as a jurisdictional matter to a small
number of extremely severe crimes, "the most serious crimes of international
concern."255 But these crimes themselves leave significant room for
interpretation as to their scope and severity. Crimes against humanity, for
example, are defined in the Rome Statute as "acts" 256 that are "committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack.",257 The category of "other inhumane acts" has
been interpreted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia to include the forced busing of women and children from one area
to another, during which they were subject to taunts and rock throwing. The
ICTR relied on the same term to find forced nakedness to constitute a crime
against humanity.259 Given this flexibility in the law, future tribunals could
conceivably find that they have jurisdiction over acts, such as patterned land
grabs, considered to be precursors to mass atrocity.260
The Rome Statute further limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC
by requiring that crimes be of "sufficient gravity." 261 While some international
judges have interpreted "sufficiently grave" as "exceptionally grave," others have
proposed more flexible rules.262 This would seem to suggest significant room for
adapting the determination of gravity to the situational approach. One possible
avenue for reform in the international realm would be for the court to accept
255 Rome Statute, Art 1 (cited in note 1).
256 See id at Art 7.1 (defining acts as, inter alia: murder, rape, enslavement, and "other inhumane acts
of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental
or physical health").
257 Id.
258 See Schabas, Introduction to the ICC at 119-20 (cited in note 90), citing Prosecutor v Krstic, judgment,
98-33-T, T 50-2, 519 (ICTY 2001).
259 See Prosecutor v Akayesu, Judgment, 96-4-T, T 10A (ICTR 1998). For further discussion of the
flexibility of the term, see Schabas, Introduction to the ICC at 107-10 (cited in note 90).
260 See Midlarsky, 82 Am Pol Sci Rev at 504 (cited in note 220).
261 Rome Statute, Art 17.1(d) (cited in note 1).
262 For example, Judge Pikis noted in a dissent in the Congo Situation: "Which cases are unworthy of
consideration by the ICC? The answer is cases insignificant in themselves; where the criminality
on the part of the culprit is wholly marginal; borderline cases." Schabas, Introduction to the ICC at
44 (cited in note 90), citing Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal
Against the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber Entitled "Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58," 01/04-186, 40 (ICC 2006) (separate and partly
dissenting opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis). However, the traveauxpreparatoires of the Rome
statute shows that an amendment to "exceptional gravity" was not accepted when it was
proposed. See Schabas, Introduction to the ICC at 201 (cited in note 90), citing Lubanga, Judgment on
the Prosecutor's Appeal at 1 81.
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"community impact statements," which many domestic courts have adopted in
response to community justice initiatives, to play a role in the determination of
the gravity of a particular crime.263 Yet, the ICC, at least, appears to be moving in
a different direction. When the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that gravity required a
showing of "social alarm,"264 the Appeals Chamber rejected this requirement
because it turned on "subjective and contingent reactions to crimes rather than
upon their objective gravity."2 6 s Under the situational approach, social alarm
would be a key indicator of exactly the types of crimes the regime ought to
prosecute.
C. Unbundling Prevention from Punishment
The deepest impact of the preventive turn in international criminal law may
in fact have nothing to do with prevention. By unbundling prevention strategies
from punishment strategies, international criminal tribunals may be freed of
some of the burden they currently carry to achieve total deterrence through
sanction alone.266 This means, at least in theory, that the design of criminal
sentences could become more flexible and could more specifically target other
regime goals such as conflict resolution, community reintegration and healing,
and the expression of moral norms. There is currently considerable debate about
267 exetothe scope and purpose of international criminal sentences. The extent to
which important crime prevention work is seen as part of the regime may have a
profound impact on these debates. Whereas before a judge might have felt
burdened to give a particular defendant a particular sentence on deterrence
grounds, the judge now can entertain other functions, including rehabilitation
and community service, if he or she is satisfied that prevention will occur
through other channels. This may explain the sentencing patterns of many
community courts in the US, which tend to issue sentences considerably lower
than they would otherwise be in a traditional court and often with more creative
sentences, such as sending defendants to anti-violence programs, rehabilitation
clinics, and the like, rather than prison.268 Perhaps the court is freed to consider
263 See Katie Long, Communit Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 BU L Rev 187,
195-96 (1995).
264 Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February
2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, 01/04-01/06-8, 42-64 (ICC 2006).
265 Schabas, Introdution to the ICC at 201 (cited in note 90), citing Lubanga, Judgment on the
Prosecutor's Appeal at 1 72.
266 This is a burden that has been called hopeless. As one scholar notes, the idea of prevention
through punishment is akin to a "religious exercise of hope." Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and
Sense ofInternational Crimina/Law, 13 Eur J Ind L 561, 593 (2002).
267 See generally Damaska, 83 Chi Kent L Rev 328 (cited in note 2).
268 See Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 Wash U J L &
Poly 63, 91 (2002).
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these alternative approaches because it has taken judicial notice of, and indeed
coordinated with, efforts to implement situational strategies of crime prevention.
There is another way in which this unbundled approach to crime
prevention interacts with the goals of international criminal tribunals. To the
extent that enhanced community outreach and community-oriented programs
increase trust and legitimacy of a given criminal regime-which the available
evidence suggests they can 269-these programs may enhance the criminal
regime's ability to express moral norms.270 A growing literature suggests that the
expressive function of the international criminal regime is the most powerful of
the regime's many effects. 2 7 1 Yet the international regime's expressive capacity is
limited by perceptions of its illegitimacy.2 72 The community's trust and faith in
the regime is especially important given the recent finding that when people
perceive their government to be procedurally just and trustworthy, they find that
the government's laws ought to be obeyed.273 The same research showed that
performance of basic government services is an important contributor to
determining people's trust and views on the legitimacy of the government.274 If
the provision of basic services and responsiveness to community needs-core
elements of the community policing approach-enhance the regime's legitimacy
even a little bit, the benefits to the expressive capacity of the regime may be
substantial. But the reverse is true as well: if peacekeepers or other actors
associated with the preventive approach fail to maintain community trust, this
could undermine the regime's moral authority. This is not an inconsiderable
- 275risk.27
269 See Jacoby, Gramckow, and Ratledge, The Impact of Community Policing at 19 (cited in note 240)
(noting that field experiments in Houston, Newark, and Baltimore showed that "closer
relationship between community and police raised citizen satisfaction with police, improved
quality of life, and lowered levels of fear of crime").
270 See Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacdly of Criminal Punishment: The Limits of the National Law
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law', 43 Stan J Intl L 39, 69-71 (2007) (noting that
the regime's expressive capacity depends on its legitimacy).
271 See generally Damaska, 83 Chi Kent L Rev 329 (cited in note 2); Sloane, 43 Stan J Intl L 39 (cited
in note 270).
272 For a recent study examining local perceptions of the ICTY and finding low levels of perceived
legitimacy, see Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic and John Hagan, Redaiming justice: The International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslaia and Local Courts 50-51 (Oxford 2011).
273 See Levi, Tyler, and Sacks, The Reasons for Compliance at *9 (cited in note 239) (using data from
American and afrobarometer surveys and finding strong evidence that trustworthiness and
legitimacy are crucial determinants of individuals' willingness to obey the law).
274 See id.
275 For an account of peacekeeper's crimes and their legal liability, see generally Tom Dannenbaum,
Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should be
Apportioned for Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Natdons
Peacekeepers, 51 Harv Intl L J 113 (2010).
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One argument for adopting this conceptual frame for community policing
is that it encourages consideration, by scholars and practitioners, of the
interaction between the prosecution and the prevention of crime. Scholars and
practitioners have been largely focused on punishment; attention to explicit
prevention schemes not only promises to enhance prevention, it also prompts
the regime to more closely coordinate prevention and punishment. The result is
not only different actors performing different functions, but a wider, more
coherent, and more realistic conception of the regime. In domestic criminal law,
much attention has been paid to the rich array of regulatory tools available to the
state to regulate crime. There is, in other words, a thick conception of the
criminal regime, one in which courts and criminal sanctions are just one piece of
the fuller regulatory framework. 2 76 Bolstering this wider conception of the
criminal regime is a central ambition of the situational scholarship. 27 7 A hallmark
of this scholarship is a shift in attention "away from the larger and more obvious
institutions of criminal justice-the prisons, the courts-toward the more
liminal institutions." 278 One result of this move has been increased scholarly
attention to the dynamic relationship between the institutions of crime
prevention-that is, the police and other public agencies involved in this new
policing-and the traditional institutions of criminal punishment.279
Of course, punishment and prevention are not wholly separable, and I do
not mean to erect them as two sides of a binary choice. Implementing
prevention strategies will inevitably entail a focus on prevention as well as
punishment. The current, overwhelming focus on punishment merely invites the
questions why we punish and how it affects the likelihood of crime. But finding
that it is lacking and suggesting alternatives for focusing explicitly on prevention
is not to say that the two will not or cannot coexist. The situational approach
offers a broader vision of the regime, one that encourages the development of
specific strategies for crime prevention as well as the coordination of those
276 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and CriminalJustice, 107 Yale
L J 1, 3 (1997) ("Criminal procedure's rules and remedies are embedded in a larger system, a
system that can adjust to those rules in ways other than obeying them.").
277 See Harcourt, The Illusion of Order at 37 (cited in note 11) (noting that the new situational criminal
literature seeks to "enrich classical doctrine with a thicker notion of class culture or human nature,
as well as a policy orientation that focuses on the environmental and situational cues that
encourage people to commit crime").
278 Morril, et al, 2005 U Chi Legal F at 312-13 (cited in note 47) (quoting Harcourt's discussion of
institutional change in the 1970s).
279 See Section V.B. For an account of the communuty justice movement, see Lanni, 40 Harv CR-CL
L Rev at 365-72 (cited in note 228) (describing the "community justice revolution" as a
development that grew out of the community policing movement). See also Fagan and Malkin, 30
Fordham Urb L J at 900 (cited in note 108) (reporting the results of a study of the Red Hook
Community justice Center in New York and highlighting the need for further integration between
community-oriented approaches to punishment and prevention).
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strategies with existing criminal institutions. One of the lessons of the situational
turn in the domestic realm is that what appears to be a largely instrumentalist
approach has powerful normative implications for the criminal regime. These
implications are problematic in some contexts (for example, enhancing the
power of the state in dangerous or discriminatory ways), but in other contexts
they may be liberating and community-enhancing, such as by freeing courts to
pursue alternative sentences and to invite greater community involvement in
criminal justice. Applying the situational turn in the international realm presents
some similar and some distinct normative implications.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conventional understanding of the international criminal regime
emphasizes retributive criminal punishment as the central tool for achieving
crime prevention; other strategies for regulating crime ex ante are largely
ignored. The domestic situational approach to crime control provides a
framework for recognizing and developing strategies to prevent international
crime beyond the threat of criminal sanction. Because the causal pathways of
international crimes are not well understood, these implications are tentative for
the moment, but they could usefully inform existing reforms and crime control
strategies and alert regime designers to potential pitfalls of the situational turn.
Moreover, by emphasizing ex ante regulatory mechanisms in a regime largely
oriented around ex post justice mechanisms, this approach illuminates some of
the dynamics between the two. As efforts to shape the environments of
international crime evolve, they may inform debates about the design and the
goals of international justice.
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